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In Bangladesh, explicit focus on poverty eradication in the development agenda requires 
formulation and implementation of sustainable anti-poverty strategies. The availability of 
reliable and timely information on the state and processes of poverty assists the policy makers 
in understanding poverty in its manifold dimensions and in identifying the causalities. The 
above requires institutional mechanism to (i) monitor poverty using multidimensional 
indicators; (ii) analyze micro impact of macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies; 
(iii) provide feedback to the policy makers in designing effective macro and poverty 
reduction policies. 
 
 CIRDAP, with assistance from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 
Canada and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) initiated a project on 
`Monitoring Adjustment and Poverty (MAP) in Bangladesh to address the above issues. 
Under the project, a number of `focus studies’ were conducted on poverty related issues. 
These studies generate information on the nature and conduits through which macro-policies 
create impact at the micro level along with providing relevant information on poverty. 
 
 The present study on `Efficacy of Alternative Poverty Alleviation Programmes in 
Bangladesh’ investigates the performance of the transfer and credit mode intervention 
systems for alleviating poverty in Bangladesh, particularly in terms of nature and range of 
activities initiated under various programmes and their impact on the poor. Among others, the 
study examines the distributional impact of the interventions at the household level and effect 
on the status of household poverty, cost effectiveness and sustainability of such programmes, 
compare the implementation mechanism and the efficacy of the various approaches in terms 
of both resource mobilisation, outputs and local participation. The conclusions of the study 
highlight the specific policy concerns needed to generate appropriate response in further 
replication and linkages of these programmes at both micro and macro level. 
 
 I hope the study will be useful to the policy makers and experts in the area. I would like to 
thank Dr. Momtaz Uddin Ahmed, Professor of Economics, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
the researcher of the study, for his excellent work. I also thank Mustafa K. Mujeri, Ex-
Director Research, CIRDAP who guided and co-ordinated the project and other staff of 
CIRDAP Research Division for their efforts in successfully completing the study. I express 
my gratitude to Dr. Rohinton Medhora, Senior Specialist of IDRC for his active interest in 
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This study examines relative efficacy of  various poverty alleviation efforts initiated and 
implement by Government (GO) as well as NGOs in Bangladesh, focussing on their relative 
programme outputs, impacts on poverty status, efficiency in resource use, employment, 
incomes and savings generation, and sustainability of the programmes.  A combination of 
various quantitative as well as qualitative measures, such as socio-economic conditions of the 
programme participants, extent of coverage of the poor, programme costs and programme 
sustainability etc., have been used to indicate efficiency of the alternative poverty alleviation 
measures.  A mix of both primary and secondary data have been used in analysing the 
relevant issues.  In order to highlight the socio-economic impacts of the various programmes 
‘programme village’ versus ‘control village’ and ‘before and after’  comparisons methods 
have been adopted using both primary and secondary sources of information collected 
through sample survey and review and analysis of published sources of data. The major 
findings of the study are the following: 
 
(i) Commensurating the nature, extent and various dimensions of poverty in Bangladesh, a 
large variety of poverty alleviation efforts, categorized broadly as the ‘transfer mode’ 
and the ‘credit mode’ are being implemented by the Government and NGOs in  
Bangladesh. Besides targeted poverty alleviation programmes based on micro- credits 
and administered by both government and NGOs, a variety of safety net measures  
representing transfer mode and involving food and/or cash assistance through FFW, 
VGD and FFE are also administered by the Government. 
 
(ii) NGOs in Bangladesh have earned recognition globally in terms of number, size and 
extent of operations. While some 20,000 NGOs are registered  to date with the 
Department of Social Welfare, the effective NGOs are not as large.  A global view of 
the magnitude of NGO coverage suggests that the MFIs are predominant agents of 
poverty alleviation in Bangladesh having an outreach of 14.08 million members.  The 
estimated cumulative disbursement of loans stands at Tk. 3728 billion of which the 
estimated MFI share is Tk. 536 billion and the cumulative savings of both formal and 
informal sector is roughly around Tk. 315 billion. However, for analytical purposes, we 
have undertaken in-depth investigations of GB, BRAC, and BRDB’s  RD-12 poverty 
alleviation programmes, WFP assisted FFW programmes and the Government assisted 
FFEP programme to highlight the impact of safety net measures. 
 
(iii)The micro-credit programmes administered by the various agencies and the MFIs have 
aimed at alleviating poverty by generating employment, augmenting productivity and 
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incomes and savings and raising the standard of living of the poor. The analysis of the 
socio-economic impacts of MFI interventions at the household levels in the programme 
villages and that in the control villages was carried to examine how the micro-credit 
interventions impacted on the lives and living standards of the programme participants  
vis-à-vis the non-participants. 
 
(iv) The results obtained from the comparisons clearly indicate better socio-economic 
conditions and higher standards of living enjoyed by the participating households than 
by the non-participants.  For example, there was a clear occupational shift in the 
programme villages towards self-employment from farm-employment, the relative 
proportions being respectively 74% in the programme villages compared  to 51% in the 
control village. The important non-farm economic activities taken up by the 
respondents included trading, masonry, carpentry, fishing, boatmen, rickshaw-pulling 
and other services. 
 
(v) The availability of credit provided the participating households access to inputs and 
services which in turn enabled them to earn average higher incomes i.e. Tk.  2500  per 
month from their various non-farm occupations compared  to that (Tk. 1580.0) earned 
by the non-participants. The micro-credit intervention also infused savings habits 
among the poor with the BRDB participants saving the highest amount of Tk. 2751 per 
month, followed by the BRAC (Tk. 1677), WFP (Tk.1038) and GB (Tk. 490) 
participants compared to only Tk. 300.0 by the non-participants.  Some of the 
programme participants also gained access to new assets such as land, machineries and 
equipment and other business assets through increased incomes and savings. 
 
(vi) Not surprisingly, the access to higher incomes enabled the programme participants to 
spend more money on food than the control village participants to keep them 
nutritionally fit, work hard and produce more.  The micro-credit intervention also 
created significant impacts on educational profile of the households, i.e. greater 
familiarity with alphabets, higher rate of schooling for children, overall higher 
investments made for education purposes (i.e. Tk. 4826 per household compared to only 
Tk. 2116 per household in the control villages). 
 
(vii) More importantly, significantly high proportion of the programme village household 
owned hand pumps and used boiled water which gave them greater access to safe 
drinking water.  In terms of possession of sanitary latrines, a significantly  contrasting 
feature is also marked in that as against 70% of the programme participants only 6% of 
the control village households use the facility. 
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(viii) The assessment of the effects of the Government’s safety net programmes (i.e. FFEP) 
reveals that the programme expanded steadily between 1993-94 and 1995-96 spreading 
to 1243 unions of the country, covering 16159 schools, benefiting 1416932 families and 
2239805 students in terms of higher school enrollment and, greater attendance rate. 
However, the programme could not make any dent in respect of reducing the drop-out 
rate and the repeaters rates. Our survey findings reveal that the FFE programme 
intervention benefited the children of the poor households not only in terms of having 
greater exposure to schooling but also having access to seasonal employment 
opportunities, access to food and cash benefits and higher food consumption. More 
importantly, a comparative assessment of cost-effectiveness of FFEP and other food-
based safety net programmes also revealed that FFEP is the most cost-effective of all 
the programmes. 
 
(ix) The issue of programme sustainability of the MFI operations has been investigated 
through examining their financial efficiency by examining their income and operating 
cost structures, measuring cost of delivery of services, unit cost of coverage and break-
even interests.  The results have been mixed. For example, Grameen Bank (GB) was 
highly dependent on donations and Government allocations to the extent of 80% for its 
incomes till 1995.  However, the interest income of GB increased from 10-20% in the 
earlier years to 60% in 1996.  But its cost of delivery of services though declined from 
initial years till 1989, increased to a peak in 1996 suggesting that the MFI is not in a 
position to cover its costs by the interest incomes and its long-run financial viability 
remains questionable.  
(x) In contrast, BRAC’s operations exhibit relatively strong position in terms of cost of 
coverage and cost of delivery of services.  Both  cost of coverage and delivery of 
services shows a declining trend in the recent years indicating positive signs of long-
term financial viability.  However, the interest incomes appear to be inadequate to offset 
the administrative expenses associated with the delivery of credit.  
 
(xi) In case of BRDB’s RD-12 programme, the cost of delivery displays a positive sign and 
also being the lowest among the MFIs and thereby the most viable among the three in 
terms of cost efficiency. 
 
(xii) The overall results of analyses of the programme sustainability suggest that the MFIs 
need to redesign their programmes to be able to cover their costs of operation through 
interest incomes received from the borrowers. While increase in the lending rate and 
improving the administrative efficiencies are the two available options, restructuring of 
the administrative style and mechanism to cut down costs and improve efficiency seems 
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to be the better option towards ensuring long-term viability and sustenance without 
being dependent on subsides as at present. 
 
(xiii) While the programmes of the MFIs have made the poor bankable without collateral 
and impacted positively on the borrowers socio-economic conditions and human 
resources development in the programme areas, the programme intervention needs to be 
expanded significantly to increase coverage  and reach the poorest of the poor.  The 
programmes are thus replicable in other areas, subject to careful redesigning aimed at 
significant slash down of administrative overheads without adversely affecting the 
current low rate of default.  This calls for serious research to scrutinize the size of loan, 
operational structure and efficiency, and most important of all, long-term financial 
viability of the future programmes in the new geographical locations. Further, an 
overriding concern of any such programme should be the coverage of the poorest of the 
poor and also the “missing middle” comprising the low-income farmers and the self-
employed groups engaged in various non-farm activities who do not qualify either for 





Chapter  1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 The Context 
 
Faced with the dire need to rescue its population from pervasive poverty, successive 
governments in Bangladesh have been increasingly focusing on designing effective poverty 
alleviation policies, which underwent several structural shifts. The apparent failure of the 
‘trickle down’ strategy and the multi-dimensionality associated with the process of poverty 
led to the growing recognition that the growth-oriented strategies need to be complemented 
by direct assault on poverty1. The advocates of independent/specific poverty alleviation 
programmes also reason that poverty alleviation is not only an outcome of the process of 
economic development but itself is also a process with positive spillover effects on the 
economic growth (BIDS 1996; CIRDAP, 1993; BIDS, 1990). 
 
The traditional policy of poverty alleviation mostly relied upon the trickle down strategy. 
The strategy, in effect, was an untargeted intervention such as Green Revolution in 
agriculture and it was expected that new technology would create adequate employment and 
income earning activities to ameliorate the poverty situation. Besides, emphasis was put on 
the industry-led trickle down mechanism to promote economic growth in the modern sector 
in order to raise employment for the poor. The industry-led approach was used under the 
aegis of import substitution strategy and it was believed that enough employment could be 
created through use of labour intensive technology. The trickle down strategy, which 
provided subsidised inputs to promote economic growth, self-sufficiency in food production, 
and industrialisation, however, mostly helped the urban and rural elites and excluded the 
majority of the poor. Moreover, provision of subsidised credit, the prime poverty alleviation 
mechanism of many government sponsored programmes, achieved marginal success due to 
the fact that access to formal loans/bank credits involve high transaction costs and require 
collateral which the rural poor could hardly meet.  
 
Against such backdrop, the late seventies and eighties saw several new developments. 
Firstly, there was an increased flow of aid to Bangladesh and much of it came as project aid, 
allocated for rural development intervention. Secondly, the transformation of IRDP into the 
Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB), the launching of the Rural Poor Programmes 
                                                 
1  Despite the shift in emphasis, the policies of the recent times, as the critics argue, mention very little about 
land distribution, lowering of ceiling, tenure improvement, and local level planning as strategies for 
reducing poverty and generating employment in the rural areas. 
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and the introduction  of Rural Development Projects by the government contributed to the 
development of a new generation of area development projects that included components 
which were targeted towards rural poor.  
 
The 1970s also saw the beginning of the NGO movement that shifted its locus from relief 
orientation to a more distinct target group approach, focusing on mobilisation of poor people 
into separate organisations through a process of conscientisation and non-formal education. 
The target group approach got an added boost with the emergence of the government 
sponsored Grameen Bank that placed growing importance on credit and promotion of income 
generating activities in the mobilisation process, a trend which gained more strength in the 
1980s. By the end of 1980s, there was a sufficient body of experience (Grameen Bank, 
Proshika, BRAC, ASA, etc.) to prove that   motivated and class-wise homogenous groups of 
poor people could make regular savings, manage credits and repay loans without collateral, 
and make decisions  and undertake productive activities, with the help of the trained and 
dedicated staff of the facilitating organisations. 
 
Encouraged by the success of aforementioned strategy to alleviate  rural poverty, various    
national organizations, international agencies, NGOs and the government as well have 
reoriented their efforts in reducing poverty by initiating targeted programmes. Although 
various programmes of poverty alleviation are now being undertaken both by government 
and NGOs, these interventions can broadly be grouped into two major categories, e.g. ‘the 
transfer mode’ and ‘the credit mode’. The transfer mode involves food and/or cash offered in 
exchange for work and training and is mainly run by government. At present, three such 
programmes in operation are Food for Works (FFW), Vulnerable Group Development 
Programme (VGD) and Food for Education (FFE). While short term food security is 
perceived as a major feature, these programmes are also attempted to address poverty through 
creation of rural infrastructure and augmenting incomes from traditional rural activities 
through access to markets and strengthening production and other linkages. These 
government programmes are often termed as safety net policies of the government as these 
attempts are envisaged to ensure fall back employment for the rural poor who may not access 
benefits of growth in the economy and other micro credit programmes of government and 
NGOs as well. 
The credit mode, in general, provides highly supervised low-cost credit to the rural poor 
without any collateral, which in turn, generates income-earning activities.  Another professed 
objective of this type of intervention is to bring rural women and other disadvantaged groups 
within the reach of the credit market, in order to engage themselves into productive ventures. 
 
It is thus imperative that an in-depth study be undertaken to analyse relative efficacy of 
the major poverty alleviation programmes focussing on their relative programme outputs, 
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sustainability of the programmes’ impacts on poverty status, efficiency in resource  use and 
the degree of complementarity of various programmes and approaches.   
1.2  Scope and Objectives of the Study 
Considering the proliferation of various types of poverty alleviating programmes that are 
being currently undertaken by both the government and the NGOs, it is prudent to analyse the 
efficacy of these programmes in some details. In particular, it may be interesting to examine 
whether these programmes have a lasting effect on poverty and also whether these 
programmes themselves are sustainable. It is especially of great interest to probe into the 
ability of the programmes to continue to operate for the rural poor. On the one hand, these 
programmes can be sustainable, only if the benefits that the poor receive from these result in 
a sustainable reduction in poverty. On the other hand, these programmes can only sustain if 
they remain financially sound since these programmes use loanable funds from various 
sources to finance productive activities of the participants. It is against this background that 
the present study has been commissioned to pursue the following objectives.  
(a) General: 
• E evaluate the performance of the selected transfer and credit mode intervention 
systems for alleviating poverty in Bangladesh. 
(b) Specific: 
• Analyse the nature and range of activities initiated under various programmes and 
highlight their direct and indirect impact on the poor; 
• Develop a methodology for evaluating distributional impact of the interventions at 
household level and effect on the status of household poverty, cost effectiveness and 
sustainability of such programmes; 
 
• Compare the implementation mechanism and the efficacy of the various approaches 
in terms of both local resource mobilisation, programme outputs, local participation 
and programme sustainability; 
• Examine the potentials of replication and linkages of these programmes at both micro 
and macro level. 
1.3  Proposed Measures of Efficiency of Alternative Poverty Alleviation 
Programmes 
A combination of measures, quantitative as well as qualitative, may be used to indicate 
efficiencies of alternative poverty alleviation programmes. In the present study, the following 
measures will be used to indicate efficiency of poverty alleviation programmes:  
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A). The cost of operation of various poverty alleviation programmes will be compared to 
assess their relative cost-effectiveness. The cost of operation of a programme will be 
defined as the sum of (I) administrative cost; (ii) loan default cost (if applicable), and 
(iii) cost of raising resources.  
 
B). While examining the improvements in the socio-economic conditions of the 
programme beneficiaries as a result of  programme intervention, efforts will be made 
to find out the relative efficiency of various programmes in covering the poorest of 
the poor. 
 
C).  In assessing the relative efficiency of various programmes, particular emphasis will 
be given to identify how programme participation affects socio-economic conditions 
of the participating households. Attempts will be made to underestand whether 
programme participation has led to increase in the literacy, skill development, 





D). The dynamic issue of sustainability of the participants’ welfare will be used as one of 
the major indicators of efficiency criteria. In this connection, data relating to income 
flow of the participants and savings generation capacity of the households will be 
analysed. The savings will be measured both in cash and in kind, such as cattle, land, 
better housing etc. 
E). In assessing programme sustainability efforts will be made to evaluate whether the 
programme is self-sustainable. For any programme to be sustainable requires that its 
lending rate exceed the cost of operation per unit of the principal. More specifically, 
the programme should be able to make profits to cover its fund costs borrowed at 
commercial rate of interest. In this case, the programme will be viable if it can at least 
equalise the cost per Taka lent with the price (rate of interest) of capital borrowed. 
Because, reliance on subsidised resources can not be the permanent feature of a 
financially viable programme. 
1.4  Data and Methodology 
Given the scope and objectives of the study, we used a mix of both primary and secondary 
data. A considerable amount of information was gathered through literature survey and use of 
relevant (un)published sources. Nevertheless, given the purpose of the study, primary data 
was collected through sample surveys, based on structured questionnaires. 
The sample survey was conducted in 5 programme villages, spread over five greater 
districts (i.e. Dhaka, Tangail, Noakhali, Rajshahi, Barisal), covering operations of Grameen 
Bank, BRAC, BRDB, FFW, and FFE. In addition, a control village was selected, keeping in 
mind similarities of land distribution, income and non-land asset holding, and occupation 
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structure between programme villages and control village. However, it was especially kept in 
mind that the control village must not have micro credit operations either by NGO i.e. or by 
any government agencies. The survey units are the rural households from the sample villages 
covered by micro credit programmes and from the control village without any programme 
intervention. While the choice of the sample villages was made jointly in consultation with 
the relevant stakeholders (i.e GB, BRAC, BRDB etc)  the programme organizers seemed to 
be inclined towards providing us  access to those villages which had better track records of 
programme administration by them. 
 
In each programme (as well as the non-programme control village) village under both 
micro credit mode and transfer mode, we collected information from 35 households which 
gave us a total sample size of (35X6) 210 respondent households.  The total sample size 
covered in the study has been in commensurate to the available time and resources.  
1.5 Organisation of the Report 
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides an in-depth literature review, 
conceptualises poverty, discusses poverty profile and its trends in Bangladesh including 
characteristics of the poor and  causes and consequences of poverty. This chapter  also 
provides   insights into the limitations of the previous studies carried out to evaluate the 
poverty alleviation programmes. The description of the selected poverty alleviation 
programmes which the present study analyses is  given in Chapter 3. A comparison among 
different components of these programmes is also contained in this chapter.  Welfare of the 
programme participants is the focus of the Chapter 4. How the programme interventions have 
impacted on the lives and living standards of the programme participants is discussed here in 
details. Special emphasis is placed on examining the sustainability of the welfare of the 
programme participants. Chapter 5 exclusively deals with various safety net programmes. In 
this chapter, the activities of the Food for Education and Food for Work programmes are 
highlighted to analyse the characteristics of the beneficiaries and efficacy of the targets set. 
Issues related to programme sustainability are covered in  Chapter 6.  An attempt is made 
here to compare the cost-effectiveness of various intervention schemes. The nature of 
resource mobilisation and utilisation of these resources in the programme are also  
highlighted here. 
 
The final chapter contains the major findings of the study in summarised form and 
delineates the areas for further research.  
 
A common disclaimer applies to most studies, especially the ones based on field 
surveys.To start with, it was not possible on our part to identify the trend of rise or decline in 
the poverty levels overtime due to lack of longitudinal data on poverty incidence in the 
survey areas. Time and resource constraints prohibited  us from gathering time series data 
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from the field levels and recourse had therefore to be made on to the secondary sources of 
information. Second, the secondary/published sources of information used to estimate 
various indices of programme sustainability were based on data which might suffer from 
usual deficiencies. Thus, the results obtained from the various estimates in some cases may  




Chapter - 2 
POVERTY PROFILE OF BANGLADESH AND A REVIEW OF THE 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT STUDIES ON POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
PROGRAMMES 
2.0 Introduction 
An assessment of the poverty alleviation programmes needs to be preceded by addressing the 
questions related to the definition and measurement of poverty. The important questions that 
generally confront an assessment study are: Who are the poor? What are the important 
dimensions of poverty? How many are they? How do we measure them? Has poverty 
declined? Has inequality increased? What are the characteristics of poor households? Where 
do the poor live? 
 
The concept of poverty is heterogeneous, and the causes of poverty are complex.2 Poverty 
is, however, now widely recognised in economics literature as a matter of deprivation, a 
failure to meet basic requirements for the sustenance of life. Thus, the evolving concept of 
poverty broadly refers to forms of economic, social and psychological deprivation occurring 
among people lacking sufficient ownership, control or access to resources for minimum 
required levels of living. The multidimensional problem of poverty involves income, 
consumption, nutrition, health, education, housing, crisis-coping capacity, insecurity, etc. 
 
At the empirical level, the measurement of poverty involves: a) an indicator of well-being 
or welfare such as per capita expenditure; b) a threshold (the poverty line) to which each 
individual’s welfare can be compared; and c) a poverty measure such as the headcount index 
which is the percentage of the population with the expenditure indicator below the threshold 
or poverty line. Differences in poverty estimates result from differences in the choices of the 
indicator, the threshold, or the poverty measures (Wodon, 1997). 
 
2.1 Poverty Profile of Bangladesh 
The Debate on Poverty Measurement 
There exists a considerable disagreement over the number of the poor in Bangladesh, mostly 
emanating from the methodological differences in counting the poor. Most researchers in the 
                                                 
2  A large volume of literature has piled up over time on the poverty  which deals with various aspects of the 
subject. Despite continuous search for arriving at a comprehensive and generally acceptable definition and 
measurement of the concept, it remains elusive even to-day and various new  measures and dimensions of 
poverty continue to evolve. 
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field, however, agree that the poverty has declined up to the early 1980’s, but remained 
interlocked into the debate over persistence of poverty afterwards, i.e. during the period of 
early 1990’s. 
 
Table 2.1 shows that Rahman and Haque (1988) came up with a different conclusion on 
the number of poor from those of Muqtada (1986), Islam and Khan (1986), and Osmany and 
Rahman (1986). Rahman and Haque (1988) assert that poverty declined, from mid 1970’s to 
mid 1980’s, owing to growth in per capita income and a relatively stable income distribution.  
 
Later, Osmany and Khan (1990) and Osmany (1990) argued that extreme povery 
increased in the second half of the 1980’s. In a rebutal, Chowdhury (1992) questioned the 
conclusions reached by Osmany (1990) and the ways of reaching such conclusions. The 
debates between Chowdhury (1993) and Osmany (1993a, 1993b) continued and remained 
unresolved. Meanwhile, Ravallion (1990) noted that differences in the conclusions were the 
results of the differences in the methods employed and questioned the comparability over 
time of the surveys for the early 1980’s. 
Table 2.1:  Percentages of population below the poverty line 
Source  1973/74 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1981/82 1983/84 1985/86 1988/89 1991/92 1994 1995/96 
Alamgir (197 Rural 84.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Urban    76.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - 
Muqtada 
(1986) 
Rural 59.9 68.2 -- 68.7 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 




Rural 47.7 62.3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 




Rural 65.3 -- -- -- 79.1 49.8 47.1 -- -- -- -- 




Rural 55.7 61.1 67.9 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 Urban -- -- -- -- 48.4 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ravallion 
(1990) 
Rural -- -- -- -- -- 53.8 45.9 49.7 52.9 -- -- 
 Urban -- -- -- -- -- 40.9 30.8 35.9 33.3 -- -- 





Urban -- -- -- -- 73.8 61.9 54.7 47.8 47.6 43.5 47.1 
 Rural -- -- -- -- 66.0 67.7 62.6 47.6 46.7 -- 49.7 
 National -- -- -- -- -- 62.6 55.7 47.8 47.5 -- 47.5 
 - - not available 
Source: Chowdhury and Shahabuddin (1990); BBS (Various years) 
 
The debate on the poverty trend between late 1980’s and early 1990’s is marked by the 
suggestion that poverty has increased, a finding at odds with official estimates. There are 
three strands of studies based upon different  sources of information. The first group of 
studies, based on the grouped (tabulated) data, published by the national statistical office, 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), report an increase of poverty in both rural and urban 
areas in the second half of 1980’s and in the early 1990’s (Khundker, Mahmud, Sen, and 
Ahmad, 1994; Hossain and Sen, 1992; Ravallion and Sen, 1996). Based on a small-scale 
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survey conducted by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), Rahman and 
Hossain (1995) and Rahman (1994) show an increase in poverty, followed by a decrease 
between the period of 1990 and 1994. But a BBS (1996) report on poverty in rural area 
suggests an increase in poverty between 1994 and 1996. The debate concerning poverty 
incidence thus remains inconclusive. 
 
The Incidence, Depth, and Severity of Poverty 
 
The incidence, depth and severity of poverty are reported in Table 2.2. These alternative 
measures of poverty, shown in the Table are--the head count index (P0, measures the 
incidence of poverty), poverty gap index (P1, measures the depth of poverty), and squared 
poverty gap index (P2, measures the severity of poverty). The poverty gap estimates how far  
the poor are on average below the poverty line as a proportion of that line and for the non-
poor the distance is zero. 
 
The New Poverty Measure: Cost of Basic Needs Method 
 
The national statistics office dropped the food energy intake method and adopted the cost of 
basic needs method, though it retained the direct calorie intake method for comparison with 
the previous estimates. The cost of basic needs method is based on the estimation that meets 
predetermined basic needs, which are held constant from year to year and across space and 
groups (World Bank, 1998). Table 2.3 shows that 36 per cent of the country’s population was 
very poor and 53 per cent was moderate poor in 1995-95. It also states that the incidence of 
poverty has declined as measured by both the upper and lower poverty lines. The BBS 
estimates claim that poverty incidence was relatively stable between 1983-84 to 1991-92, and 
then experienced a significant decrease in 1995-96. It also reveals that the drop in poverty in 
recent years was higher in urban than in the rural areas. 
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Table 2.2:  Headcount, poverty gap and squared poverty gap measures of poverty, 1973/74 to 1995/96 
1973/74 1981/82 1983/84 1985/86 1988/89 1991/92 1995/96 Measures Source 
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Ravallion (1990) -- -- 72.7 62.3 42.3 54.6 34.8 43.7 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
BIDS (1992) 71.3 -- 65.3 -- 50.0 -- 41.3 -- 43.8 -- -- -- -- -- 
 Sen (1993) -- 63.2 -- 48.4 -- 42.6 -- 30.6 -- 33.4 -- -- -- -- 
Ravallion & Sen 
(1994) 
-- -- -- -- 53.8 40.9 45.9 30.8 49.7 35.9 52.9 33.6 -- -- 
Head-count 
Index, P(O) 
WB (1998) & BBSa 
(1997) 
-- -- -- -- 61.9 67.7 54.7 62.6 47.8 47.6 47.6 46.7 47.1 49.7 
Ravallion (1990) -- -- 24.5 22.2 10.7 17.5 7.2 12.3 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
BIDS (1992) 25.6 -- 20.2 -- 13.2 -- 9.2 -- 10.8 -- -- -- -- -- 
Sen (1993) -- 21.1 -- 14.9 -- 12.1 -- 7.3 -- 7.7 -- -- -- -- 
Ravallion & Sen 
(1994) 
-- -- -- -- 15.0 11.4 10.9 7.3 13.1 8.7 14.6 8.4 -- -- 
Poverty Gap, 
P(1) 
WB (1998) & BBSa 
(1997) 
-- -- -- -- 16.83 14.26 12.50 10.85 16.01 11.06 18.06 12.00 15.40 9.19 
Ravallion (1990) -- -- 10.6 10.3 4.0 7.5 2.2 4.7 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
BIDS (1992) 11.8 -- 8.1 -- 4.9 -- 2.9 -- 3.7 -- -- -- -- -- 
Sen (1993) -- 9.5 -- 6.2 -- 4.7 -- 2.4 -- 2.4 -- -- -- -- 
Ravallion & Sen 
(1994) 




WB (1998) & BBSa 
(1997) 
-- -- -- -- 6.72 5.78 4.27 3.81 6.07 3.83 7.15 4.43 5.74 3.44 
Note: a  Based on cost of basic needs method;  
Source: Sen and Islam (1993), Hussain and Sen (1993), Ravallion and Sen (1994), World Bank (1998). 
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Table 2.3: Headcount Indices of poverty with the cost of basic needs method, 1983-84 to 1995-96 
(Percentage of population below the poverty line) 
Hard-core Poor (Lower Poverty Line) Moderate Poor (Upper Poverty Line)  
1983/84 1985/86 1988/89 1991/92 1995/96 1983/84 1985/86 1988/89 1991/92 1995/96 
National 40.91 33.77 41.32 42.69 35.55 58.50 51.73 57.13 58.84 53.08 
Rural 42.62 36.01 44.30 45.95 39.76 59.61 53.14 59.18 61.19 56.65 
Urban 28.03 19.90 21.99 23.29 14.32 50.15 42.92 43.88 44.87 35.04 
Source: BBS (1997), World Bank (1998) 
Characteristics of Rural Poor 
 
Bangladesh is predominantly rural; of the 118 million people, over 80 per cent live in rural 
areas. The available estimates also confirm that poverty is largely rural3. Table 2.4 illustrates 
the differences in categories such as demographic characteristics and education among 
extremely poor, poor, and non-poor households. The poor households have a larger number 
of children below 10 years of age, fewer members in the income-earning age group and a 
higher child-women ratio than the non-poor. The poor have larger number of illiterate adult 
and lesser number of students in age group of 6-15.  
 
Table 2.4: Characteristics of rural poor and non-poor households 
Extremely Poor Poor Non-Poor Variables 
1987/88 1994 1987/88 1994 1987/88 1994 
Demographic Characteristics 
    Family Size 6.5 5.3 6.0 5.4 5.9 5.3 
   Age of household head 42.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 43.0 42.0 
    Family members (%)       
    Age below 10 yrs 34.6 38.3 31.6 33.9 24.2 27.5 
    Males above 10 yrs 33.3 29.2 35.0 31.2 42.7 37.1 
    Adult males (16+) 24.1 23.8 26.8 25.6 33.4 30.3 
    Child women ratio 71.7 90.0 69.2 64.1 56.9 54.6 
Education (%)       
Students in age groups 6-15 -- 51.4 -- 50.5 -- 53.8 
Male 52.8 28.3 63.0 22.5 70.0 29.7 
Female 43.0 23.1 56.5 28.1 61.8 24.1 
Illiterate adult 85.5 71.9 63.6 68.7 47.0 61.5 
Literate adult 9.7 2.9 14.4 4.3 24.7 9.6 
Land and Technology       
Per capita owned land 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.4 2.2 2.3 
Per capita cultivated land 1.6 0.5 1.9 0.3 2.7 1.8 
Per cent area under tenancy 23.1 -- 25.0 -- 21.5 -- 
Per cent under HYV rice 30.9 -- 37.1 -- 45.1 -- 
Percent area under irrigation 24.2 -- 26.0 -- 35.1 -- 
Source: Hussain et. al.  (1992); BBS (1994). 
   
                                                 
3  Though urban poverty is on increase in the recent years, poverty is still by an large rural phenomenon in 
most Asian countries (Ahmed M.U. 1994). 
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Poverty and Inequality 
 
The income inequality has increased nationally and within the rural and urban sectors (Table 
2.5). Inequality is higher in urban than in rural areas and has increased over time in both 
sectors, especially between 1991-92 and 1995-96. Urban inequality has increased much more 




Table 2.5: Gini indices of inequality, 1983-84 to 1995-96 
Normalisation by lower poverty lines Normalisation by upper poverty lines  
1983/84 1985/86 1988/89 1991/92 1995/96 1983/84 1985/86 1988/89 1991/92 1995/96 
Gini index          
National 25.53 25.66 27.94 27.15 31.01 25.38 24.73 27.02 25.92 29.34 
Rural 24.33 23.80 25.96 25.06 26.43 24.62 23.58 25.71 24.34 26.47 
Urban 29.46 29.87 31.78 31.09 36.03 29.31 29.34 31.35 30.68 35.28 
Decomposition          
Within group 24.93 24.64 26.74 25.93 28.02 25.17 24.38 26.46 25.25 27.93 
Stratification -0.29 -0.54 -0.79 -0.84 -1.80 -0.02 -0.01 -0.19 -0.27 -0.52 
Between 
group 
0.89 1.56 1.99 2.06 4.79 0.23 0.36 0.75 0.94 1.93 
Note: The between group component measures the inequality between urban and rural areas, while the within 
group component measures the inequality within urban and rural areas. Stratification is a measure of 
overlap between urban and rural areas in the distribution of consumption. The measures of per capita 
consumption used to compute the Gini index are normalised by the cost of basic needs poverty lines 
(lower and upper) in order to account for difference in costs of living between geographical areas.  
Source: World Bank (1998). 
 
Decomposition of the national Gini coefficient by sector indicates that the increase in 
national Gini was  not only due to rising inequality within sector, but also to rising inequality 
between the urban and rural sectors. The within sector component of the decomposition 
increased substantially between 1991-92 and 1995-96. 
 
Table 2.6: Elasticity of Poverty Measures with respect to Growth and Inequality, 1983-84 to 1995-96 






















Head-cot -1.98 -2.42 1.28 -1.29 -1.43 0.52 
Povertgap -2.67 -3.47 2.30 -2.17 -2.57 1.49 
Squared Poverty gap -3.30 -4.39 3.12 -2.85 -3.44 2.18 
Note: These estimates use a panel of poverty measures at the regional level. The net impact of growth on 
poverty is the impact after netting out the impact of the increase in inequality on poverty. 
Source : World Bank (1998). 
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2.2.  Public Expenditure, Safety Net Programmes, NGO Programmes 
It is believed that effective public spending can reduce poverty. According to World Bank 
(1998) social spending in real terms increased from less than Taka eight billion in 1989-90 to 
Taka 28.54 billion in 1995-96 in constant 1995-96 prices. Real education expenditure has 
risen the most, both in absolute term and relative terms, from Taka 3.15 billion in 1989-90 to 
Taka 15.88 billion in 195-96. Public health spending has witnessed almost five folds increase, 
from Taka 1.37 billion in 1989 to Taka 5.85 billion in 1995-96. Education and health together 
represented 76.14 per cent of ADP social spending in 1995-96. Overall, the share of ADP 
contributions to education and health has more than doubled since 1989-90, from 10 to 24 per 
cent. 
 
Government Safety Net Programmes 
 
The safety net programmes of the government serve both transfer payment and human capital 
accumulation. The three biggest programmes are Food for Work, which provides wheat in 
exchange for work in rural infrastructure projects, Food for Education which initially 
provided wheat now provides wheat and rice to poor children in return for regular primary 
school attendance and Vulnerable Group Development provides food grain and training to 
disadvantaged women. Test relief is similar programme to support activities like cleaning 
ponds and bushes and making minor repairs to rural roads, schools, mosques, madrashas. 
Table 2.7 shows that Food for Work is by far the largest programme, but the fastest growing 
programme is food for education, which began in 1993-94 in only 79 selected rural villages 
and subsequently spread to 237 villages. 
Table 2.7: Food Grain Distribution under Government Programmes 
 (thousand tonnes) 
Programme 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 
Wheat total 604 834 253 773 999 1077 
FFW 420 512 164 424 493 468 
FFE - - - 79 168 237 
VGD 139 204 76 167 182 172 
Test relief 32 94 3 71 92 88 
Others 13 24 10 32 64 112 
Rice total 194 91 365 71 66 70 
Grain total 798 925 618 844 1065 1147 
Source: World Food Programme, quoted in World Bank (1998) 
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NGO Programmes and Microcredit 
 
By now, NGOs of Bangladesh have attained  recognition in international arena, in terms of 
mandate, size and orientation. The sector witnessed a remarkable growth which has not 
remained limited only to large internationally known NGOs. Some 20,000 NGOs have 
registered to date with the Department of Social Welfare.  Of these, the number of active 
NGOs are  small. The NGO Affairs Bureau, charged with registering foreign-funded NGOs, 
registered 1185 NGOs by November, 1997 (World Bank, 1998). Table 2.8 shows the 
cumulative foreign-funded projects and the amounts released to the NGOs. One would note 
that the cumulative disbursement increased 10 times between 1990-91 to 1996-97. 
 
Table 2.8: Foreign-funded NGO Projects and Amounts released to NGOs, 1991-98 
Number of projects US $ Amounts approved US $ Amounts released Period 
New  Cumulative New  Cumulative New  Cumulative 
1990-91 464 472 158.54 158.91 106.60 112.03 
1991-92 549 1021 287.11 446.02 121.64 233.67 
1992-93 626 1647 399.88 845.91 195.71 429.38 
1993-94 581 2228 315.02 1160.93 171.01 600.38 
1994-95 579 2807 440.69 1601.62 209.50 809.89 
1995-96 702 3509 366.81 1968.43 259.30 1069.19 
1996-97 746 4255 246.50 2138.31 250.14 1277.72 
Till Nov.,97 324 4579 72.31 2083.53 84.79 1288.57 
Source: NGO Affairs Bureau, quoted in World Bank (1998). 
 
The generation of self-employment in non-farm activities is advanced as a way for 
reducing poverty. The poor is constrained in such employment opportunity by lack of 
financial resources and necessary human capital. The access to formal credit market by the 
poor has been restrained as commercial banks, in effect, shy away from the assetless, and  
their operating procedures have a bias towards well-off and vocal segments of the rural 
society. Given this backdrop, the microfinance programmes of Grameen Bank and other 
NGOs lend to groups of poor borrowers in which each group members receive a loan in 
sequence. No collateral is required in this system of joint liability venture. The Grameen 
Bank had 2.06 million micrcredit clients in 1996, mostly women, and BRAC, Proshika, and 
ASA had 1.84, 1.30, and 0.57 million, respectively. This puts the size of these organisations 
at par with the Bangladesh Rural Development Board, the government agency that provides 
microcredit. According to its own estimates, BRDB has so far disbursed TK.8500 million in 
micro credit to the poor for income and employment generation opportunities through its 9 
poverty alleviation projects spread all over Bangladesh. There are at present 57000 primary 
co-operatives with 1575000 members(of whom 60% are women)who accumulated TK 950 
million as their own savings.  A global view of the magnitude of NGO coverage in terms of 
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various indicators suggests clearly that the MFIs are predominant agents of poverty 
alleviation in Bangladesh and thus deserves necessary attention from the researchers and 
policy makers. According to CDF (Credit Development Forum), a forum of NGOs in 
Bangladesh which compiles and publishes studies on MFIs in Bangladesh, the formal and 
semi-formal (MFIs) sectors have at present an outreach of 14.08 million members throughout 
Bangladesh of which 9.85 million belong to the MFIs.  The cumulative loan disbursement 
volume stands at Tk. 3728 billion of which the MFIs’ share is estimated to be Tk. 536 billion.  
And the cumulative savings of the members including formal and semi-formal sectors is 
around Tk. 315 billion. 
2.3  Impact Assessment 
In a review of the studies on assessment of the impact of microcredit, spreading over early 
eighties to recent years, Rahman (1998) finds that most of the studies used project 
comparison as their methodology. Table- 2.9 provides a summary of the methodologies of 
some impact assessment studies. Some of the studies use opinion of borrowers, history of 
borrowers, and qualitative techniques.   
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Table 2.9: A Summary of the Methodology of Some Impact Assessment Studies 
Source Organisation covered Methodology Sample size 
Hossain (1986) GB Project control comparison 613 
Rahman (1986) GB Project control comparison 393 
Hossain (1988) GB Project control comparison &   
before-after comparison 
240 
BIDS (1990) BRDB-RDP,BRDB-KSS, RESP, RDRS-
RWP,BRAC, Saptagram, URDEP, 
Swanirvar, RDRS_CP, SEDPW 
Project control comparison 900 
ASA (1992) ASA Opinion of borrowers 1200 
ASA (1993) ASA Opinion of borrowers 200 
Olofsson (1993) GB History of borrowers 40 
Gibbons & Todd 
(1993) 
GB Project control compatrison 80 
Alamgir (1974) Pos, GB, BRAC Comparison of Pos, GB and BRAC 460 
Pitt &Khandker 
(1995) 
GB, BRAC, BRDB Project control comparison 1800 
IMEC, PK (1990) Proshika Project control comparison 1800 
Rahman (1996) Eight Pos of PKSF Borrowers with various number of 
loans and PO members waiting for 
loan 
960 
Mustafa et. Al. 
(1996) 
BRAC Project control comparison; 
comparison between long term 
borrowers & new borrowers; 
comparison between above & below 
threshold level of credit 
2125 
Mahmud (1996) BRAC, ICDDR,B Comparison among four types of 
households: BRAC only, ICDDRB 
only, both, no programme 
3833 
Zohir (1990) Swanirvar Comparison of credit and non-credit 
SV villages 7 control villages  
400 
Sculer & Hashemi et. 
Al. (1995, 1996, 
1997) 
GB/BRAC Qualitative study for 3 yrs in 6 
villages 7 nationally reprsentative 
sample 
1225 
Source: Rahman (1998). 
Rahman (1988) in her review records certain positive impacts, on the basis of agreement 
by most studies, despite their differences in methodology, sample size, and affiliations. 
According to her review, microcreit has led to increase in (i) income among borrowers, (ii) 
saving, investment, and asset associated with increase in income, (iii) consumption pattern, 
emanating from rise in income, (iv) expenditure on human capital, and (v) labour force 
participation, greater access to income and a greater decision making power of women. She 
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also records areas as lack of success, which include: lack of scope for profitable activities in 
some regions, low rate of returns to labour for activities usually preferred by women, lack of 
success in the use of microcredit due to the adverse demographic characteristics of the 
household. A summary of the findings of some impact assessment studies is presented in 
Table 2.10. 
 
Table 2.10: A summary of the findings of some impact assessment studies 
Source Economic Indicator Type of 
Change 
Social Indicator Type of change 







Hossain (1988) Working capital 
Non agricultural investment 
Agricultural investment 







Social Investment + 












IMEC (1995) Economic empowerment + Social empwerment + 
Pitt & Khandkar 
(1988) 
Various laboursupply 











Rahman(1996) Household consumption expenditure 








No. of meals taken by men 
No. of meals taken by 
women 
School enrollment 
Attitude to education 
Pure drinking water, 






Hashemi et. Al. 
(1996) 
  Women empowerment + 
Schuler et. Al. 
(1988) 




Source: Rahman (1998) 
 
From the above analysis, it appears that positive impacts of micrcredit on poor 
households’ social and economic situation are quite well established. Therefore, the research 
on microcredit needs not centre around the traditional impact assessment method which 
examines the impact on major economic or social variables, because there still remain many 
major unanswered questions which include:  
 
• Are safety net and microcredit programmes sustainable?  
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• Does the lending rate exceed the cost of operation per unit of the principal? Does the 
cost per Taka lent equalise with the price (rate of interest) at the least? 
• Does the microcredit address effectively the dynamic issue of sustainability of the 
participant’s welfare?  
• Do these programmes have efficacy in covering the poorest of the poor? 
• Are these programmes operationally viable i.e. interest income covers direct costs of 
credit delivery? 
• Are they financially, economically and institutionally viable? 
• Should government be involved directly  in handling the  microcredit programmes?  
• Do the public safety net programmes attain their objectives?  
• Are they well targeted?  
• Are they cost-effective? 
   
In the subsequent chapters of the present study we make a modest attempt to provide 




SALIENT FEATURES OF THE MICRO-CREDIT PROGRAMMES 
OF THE MICRO FINANCE INSTITUTIONS (MFIS) IN 
BANGLADESH 
 
This chapter seeks to look at the nature, type and scope of credit programmes in order to set 
the scene for understanding the efficacy of these growing anti-poverty programmes. The 
chapter sets out with a brief analytical note, grounding the emergence of Micro Finance 
Institutions (MFIs). A sketch on the evolution of the micro credit programmes follows. The 
rest of the chapter is organised to delineate features such as organisation, target groups, 
coverage, borrower eligibility conditions, credit system features, etc.  
 
3.1 The Analytical Setting for the Emergence of Micro Finance Institutions 
(MFIs) 
 
Credit market imperfections asymmetrically impact the poor in rural areas through creating 
inefficiency in both production and consumption (Foster, 1995; Townsend, 1994).  Against 
such backdrop, many developing countries had instituted government-directed financial 
institutions to provide low-priced credit to the poor, but much of the analyses on these 
institutions suggest that directed rural credit programmes have rarely created feasible 
alternatives to stave off credit market imperfections (Adams et al, 1983, 1984; Feder et al, 
1989; Sacay and Randhawa 1995; von Pischke et al, 1983).  From sustainability viewpoint, 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983) argue that targeted credit may fail to reach the poor even if 
the price of the credit is right owing to asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement 
that afflict rural credit market. For making the system sustainable, Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) 
point out the necessity of financial institutions that could shun imperfect information and 
enforcement. 
  
The essential feature of the MFIs are: group-based lending, social collateral and  peer 
pressure. The group-based lending, footed in peer pressure for monitoring and contract 
enforcement, avoids adverse selection of borrowers and improves the prospects of loan 
recovery,(Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990). Basely and Coate (1995) argue that ‘social 
collateral,’ being a powerful institution in the circumstances of peer pressure and squeeze of 
adverse selection, acts as deterrent to loan default. Group lending can help poor self-selecting 
programmes, making it a robust instrument of identification and targeting. 
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3.2 Evolution of MFIs in Bangladesh 
  
Targeted credit programme was experimented in a pilot project in the village Jobra of 
Chittagong in August, 1976 to test the credit worthiness of the poor in absence of physical 
collateral. The central bank of the country, Bangladesh Bank facilitated Professor Yunu’s 
work by arranging funding from the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD). With the government holding of about 90 per cent of shares in paid-up capital, GB 
was operational as an independent bank on October 2, 1983 to work exclusively with the 
poor, defined as individuals owing less than 50 decimal of land . 
 
With the growing success of GB, non-governmental organisations, popularly known as 
NGOs working towards poverty alleviation embarked upon credit programmes, with variance 
in delivery mechanisms, institutional set up and emphasis, by targeting the rural poor with 
particular emphasis on reaching out to the disadvantaged women and unemployed youth. It is 
said that more than 100 NGOs are at present engaged in micro credit operation, with an 




The country’s largest NGO, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), set 
up to help resettle households displaced during the country’s war of independence in 1971, 
soon shifted its loci of programmes from rehabilitation to developing anti-poverty 
programmes, credit being one of the major instrument of intervention. BRAC’s approach has 
been to combine lending with the delivery of organisational inputs, such as skills promotion 
and awareness building (Lovell, 1992). The BRAC’s programme, Rural Development 
Programme (RDP), a packaged services to the poor incorporating awareness building, 
training, savings generation, credit disbursement and income generating activities.  
 
 
The biggest public sector agency involved in anti-poverty programme is Bangladesh 
Rural development Board (BRDB), successor to Integrated Rural Development Programme 
(IRDP), which adopted two-tier cooperative system evolved by the BARD, Comilla, during 
the sixties. With its expansion in size and coverage, the role of BRDB evolved from that of 
promoting agricultural and rural development to concentrating on poverty alleviation 
programmes. The agency now has eight operating rural poor projects (RPPs). RD-12 is the 
largest project of RPP, with a budget of approximately TK 30 crore per annum.   
3.3. The Grameen Bank 
Coverage 
 
The Grameen Bank (GB) came into inception as  “Grameen Bank Project” in the Village 
Jobra of Chittagong in August, 1979 and in Tangail in November, 1979. Table 3.1 shows that 
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the number of GB branches has increased from 501 in 1988 to 1105 in 1997, representing an 
increase of 120 per cent. At the end of 1997, the GB coverage of programme villages 
increased from  10552 villages in 1988 to 37937 villages in 1997 showing a rise of 259.46 
per cent. The number of GB members increased from 979 thousands in 1988 to 2057 
thousands in 1997, up by 110.11 per cent. Accordingly, number of total centres jumped by 
229.04 per cent in the corresponding period.   
 
When membership and borrowers are disaggregated by gender, the same is reported. 
During 1988-1997period, women members increased by 385.96 per cent. During later periods 
especially in1996, there is drop in membership from that of the previous year. The 
membership declined from 1859094 in 1995 to 1441657 in 1996, down by 22.45 per cent. 
The rate of increase in membership in the later periods show a secular upward trend, though 
not a spectacular rise as witnessed in the intial years. Total number of borrowers rose from 
272430 in 1988 to 1783960 in 1996, showing an increase of 554.83 per cent. The trend 
growth rate in the later periods is moderate . 
 
Table 3.1: Year-wise Expansion of Grameen Bank by Branch, Villages, Centres, 



























1988 501 10552 16917 2746 19663 13881 83194 979075 840.3 138.52 979 
1989 641 15073 24016 2960 26976 14694 117762 132456 918.6 114.6 1033 
1990 781 19536 31050 3156 34206 15588 158323 173911 1014 99.78 1113 
1991 915 25248 39451 3300 42751 16011 197275 213286 1078 87.49 1165 
1992 1015 30619 47854 3513 51367 18022 266857 284879 1277 87.45 1365 
1993 140 33667 53879 3770 57649 22266 350032 372298 1642 103.23 1745 
1994 1045 34913 56055 3866 59921 24321 387824 412145 1811 115.64 1928 
1995 1055 35533 - - 111 24923 400083 424993 - - - 
1996 1079 36420 - - 26681 24345 409446 433791 - - 1909 
1997 1105 37937 -  64701 - - - - - 2057 
Source: Various Annual Reports of GB 
Savings 
 
Total savings of GB increased from 672 million Tk. in 1988 to 6596 million Tk., representing 
a growth of 881.39 per cent. The members’ savings rose from 297.4 million Tk. to 4564.8 
million Tk. in 1997, showing a phenomenal increase of 1434.82 per cent.   
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Table 3.2: GB’s savings by type and gender, 1988 – 1997 (million taka) 
 
Group fund saving Emergency fund saving Total saving Year 
Women Men Total Women Men Total  
1988 215.6 81.8 297.4 34.8 19.6 54.5 672 
1989 349.2 101.8 451 59.4 24.6 84.01 1069 
1990 526.7 122.9 649.6 98.1 30.7 128.8 1687 
1991 746.8 145.1 891.9 145.4 36.7 182.1 2376 
1992 1130.6 177.2 1307.8 151.6 38.5 190.1 3479 
1993 1836.5 230.9 2117.4 172.6 44.31 216.9 6264 
1994 2850.6 296.8 3147.4 177.4 45.2 222.6 8969 
1995 4000.1 249.1 4249.2 182.3 46.1 228.4 650 
1996 4094.5 243.4 4337.9    5256 
1997 4310.6 254.18 4564.8    6596 
Source: Various Annual Reports 
Drop-outs of the GB Members 
According to various annual reports of GB, the overall drop-outs from the credit programme 
of GB varied  between 2 to 5 per cent from among  its total membership (Table 3.3). The 
drop-out rates were not significantly different among the male and female loanees.  
 
 
Table 3.3: GB’s rate of drop-outs 
 




Drop-out Women (%) Drop-out men (%) 
1988 490363 18006 3.67 3.8 2.88 
1989 662263 22004 3.32 3.45 2.27 
1990 899538 37948 4.36 4.52 2.74 
1991 1066426 52277 4.9 5.03 3.33 
1992 1424395 61163 4.29 4.42 2.38 
1993 1814916 40749 2.24 2.3 1.73 
1994 2013130 92942 4.62 4.5 6.39 
1995 2065661 - 4.76 - - 
1996 2059510 - 3.98 - - 
1997 2272503 - 2.68 - - 




The GB’s annual reports claim very low default rate. Table 3.4 shows that with the increase 




Table 3.4: Grameen Bank’s Profile of Defaulters 
Year Total borrowers 52 weeks Defaulters as 
percentage of Total 
borrowers 
1988 472430 1.14 
1989 648.267 1.26 
1990 852662 1.91 
1991 1041630 2.7 
1992 1385324 2.01 
1993 1682914 1.05 
1994 1860674 1.42 
1995 1870371 2.89 
1996 1783960 3.78 
1997 2098204 6.82 
  Source:  Various Annual Reports 
 
External Funds 
The external funds channelled to GB shows a secular upward trend. External flows have 
increased from 1413.52 million Taka in 1988 to 26657.7 million taka in 1997 an increase of 
17 times (Table 3.5). The implications of dependency on  external finance will be discussed 
in the later chapter. 
 
Table 3.5: Grameen’s Sources of External Funds (Million Taka) 
Year BB IFAD NORAD Dutch SIDA Ford F. CB Grant Total 
1988 14.8 747.2 187.9 44.3 220.7 18.08  180.54 1413.52 
1989 193.8 957.1 267.9 44.3 238.9 18.08  377.22 2097.3 
1990 183.4 1085.7 267.9 44.3 238.9 66.37  967.12 2853.69 
1991 173 1085.7 267.9 44.3 238.9 66.37  1351.46 3227.63 
1992 322.76 1257.7 267.9 44.3 238.9 66.37 3.1 2445.86 4324.13 
1993 3500 1352.6 267.9 44.3 238.85 66.37  2886.27 8356.29 
1994 3500 1690.4 267.9 44.3 238.85 66.37 3250 261.49 7011.49 
1995 3789.25 1657.8 267.9 44.3 238.85 66.37 228.34 62165.2 68457.6 
1996  1620.9 267.9 44.3 238.85 66.37 711.37 43280.1 46229.8 
1997  1690.3 267.9 44.3 238.85 66.37 3.18 25367.8 26657.7 
Source: Various Annual Reports 
Note: BB = Bangladesh Bank, IFAP = International Fund for Agricultural Development, NORAD = Norwegian 
Aid Agency, SIDA = Swedish International Development Agency, Ford F. = Ford Foundation. 
3.4 BRAC’s Rural Development Programme (RDP) 
RDP, the largest core programme of BRAC, was set up in 1986. At the end of 1997, the RDP 






The BRAC’s RDP programme recorded a phenomenal increase in terms of villages, branches 
and members. The RDP ‘s village coverage increased from 307 villages in 1989 to 5123 
villages in 1997, showing a 32-fold rise in less than a decades time. While in 1989 average 
member per branch was 4403.4, it rose to 9865.5 per branch in 1997. During the 
corresponding period, total members have risen by 1928.41 per cent (Table 3.6). 
  









1989 80 307 6434 4403.4 352269 
1990 120 931 1829 904.13 108459 
1991 135 1099 3128 1017.8 137361 
1992 140 687.8 2576 365.35 51149 
1993 165 1403.4 2014 439936 825790 
1994 299 1322.4 2759 37163 1111715 
1995 339 978.2 44656 4456.6 1510802 
1996 230 5345 51239 6521.7 1500000 
1997 235 5123.9 62000 9865.5 2200000 




BRAC’s credit programme is now one of the largest in the world with more than 38 million 
dollars in members’s savings at the end of 1997 (Annual Report, 1997). According to the 
report, 80 per cent of its members make regular savings deposits. 
 
 
Disbursement and Use of Loan 
 
At the end of 1997, BRAC disbursed 469 million US dollars. BRAC has developed sector 
programmes, wherein members can use their money. BRAC’s poultry programme is  one of 
the largest in Bangladesh. By 1997, 1.2 million women were involved in the poultry sector 
and a total of 9.37 million day old chicks were being reared (Annual Report, 1997). More 
than 50, 000 women are involved in agriculture programme and in 1997, more than 11, 000 
farmers were brought under this programme with a total of 2687 acres of  land under 
vegetable cultivation.     
 
Table 3.7 shows that major disbursement was made in rural trading, followed by poultry 
and livestock. A significant amount was also disbursed to its members for investment in food 
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processing and agriculture. These are small-scale, agro-based and agro-support activities, 
aimed at contributing  towards employment and income generation for the rural poor.  
 
Table 3.7: Sectorwise Disbursement: Cumulative up to 1997 (Taka 21,585 million) 
Table 3.10: Sectorwise disbursement: cumulative up to 1997 
 (Taka 21,585 million) 
                Sector Percentage of Disbursement 
Rural Trading 42 
Poultry and Livestock 19 
Food Processing 16 
Agriculture 11 
Fisheries 4 
Rural Transport 3 
Housing 3 
Cottage Industry 2 
            Source: Annual Report, 1997 
 
Default and Drop-out Rates 
 
BRAC’s annual reports claim that its rate of repayment is around 98 per cent, leaving a 
default rate of only 2 per cent. When drop-out is disaggregated by gender, the incidence  of 
male members tends to be  relatively high, though it hardly leaves any  impact on the total 
since BRAC’s membership is highly skewed towards women members. 
 
 
3.5  BRDB’s RD-12  Programme 
 
BRDB’s project RD-12 provides credit, skill development training and other human 
development inputs to the poor. Savings mobilisation is an integral part of the RD-12 




The project covers 139 villages, with an annual outlay of Taka 30 crore.  Recently, it has 
been extended to 145 villages. Membership has risen from 23831 in 1989 to 100447 in 1996, 
showing an increase of 321.49 per cent.  
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Loan Default and Drop-out 
The BRDB’s RD-12 also exhibits a low default rate (3.8), being at a minimum, with some 
yearly fluctuations. It peaks in 1991 with a rate of 13.3 per cent. 
 
Table 3.8: BRDB’s Defaulters as Percentage of Total Borrowers 











 Source: BRDB 
 
 
The trend drop-out rate remains around 6 percent. The drop-out rate peaks in 1992, with a 
rate of 15.83 percentage of total members. When compared by gender disaggregation, male 
drop-out rate is found to be relatively high (3.9). 
Table 3.9: BRDB-RD-12’s Drop Outs 
 
 







1989 154.15 1.47 1.86 0.57 
1990 198.09 1.63 2.53 1.3 
1991 267.5 4.77 3.82 1.4 
1992 346.32 15.83 4.75 1.5 
1993 427.7 9.53 5.22 1.75 
1994 452.02 6.31[ 7.31 1.96 
1995 454 7 7.25 1.08 
1996 480 7.25 6.2 1.02 
1997 440 6.2 4.5 1.25 
       Source:  BRDB 
 
A comparative scenario of the important features of the micro-credit operations by the 
three leading NGOs  of Bangladesh is presented in Appendix Table 3.1.  Except some minor 
differences in their programme coverage, all the NGOs operate on the same basic principles, 
serve the same target groups, and work to achieve the same goals and visions.  
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Appendix Table  3.A 
A Comparative Summary of the Features of Grameen Bank, BRAC-RDP  
and BRDB-RD-12 Micro-Credit Programmes 
Organisation Category 
Grameen Bank BRAC-RDP BRDB-RD-12 
Date of origin 1976 as project,       1983 as GB 1986 (RDP+RCP)  
Organisation: 
Units  
Head Office          




1 (Dhaka)               
1112                       
38551(as in 1998)                           
                                   
 
1 (Dhaka)                    
330                              
51239 
                               




No of Members:    
Present 
members   
Past members       
% of Women 
Members 
  
2334780( in 1998)   
42 (in 1976)           
95% 
                                   
2230000                      
-                                   
90% 
 
453857                    




UDFA, IFAD, NORAD,SIDA, KFW and 
GTZ,CIDA,OECF, The Ford Foundation,The 
Dutch Government. 
AKF,CIDA, 








Collateral arrangements- peer pressure, peer 
support and social obligation within the group. 
No collateral 
method 
        - 
Loan Repeat 
Eligibility 
Any group member who regularly repays the 
weekly instalment.  
Unlimited – if 
repayment record is 
good 
        - 
Loan 
holding(less 
than0.50 acre of 
holding) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Assets:-have 
cultivable land 
within 0.5 to (1-
5) acre 




resident of the 
village. 
Yes Yes Yes 
Age:- From (18-





Yes Yes Yes 
Others- should 
not be the 
member of any 
other 
organisation 
Yes Yes Yes 
Loan size The minimum loan size vary from one activity 
to another   5000+ 
General loan size 




The average loan 
size varies from, 
2500-10,000 
Recovery Rate 98% 98% 97% 
 41
Maturity  1-11 month                





Weekly regular instalment.  Weekly  Weekly. 
Interest Rate 
 
20% Declaring 20% Declaring Face value 16% 
Interest charged 
by Bank 
5.5% BB, 6.8% NCB  5% 
Service charge 
by NGO project 
20% 16% 2% 
Manager Fees   2% 
Group Fund  
(GF) 
5% 4% 5% 
Risk Fund 1% 1%  
Insurance  1%  
RLF   2% 
Use of Loan General use, Housing, Processing and 
Manufacturing, Agriculture and Forestry, 











33 IGA’s , Credit 








shopkeeping.           

















Chapter  4 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MICRO-CREDIT 
INTERVENTIONS  ON THE SURVEY HOUSEHOLDS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter attempts to assess the impact of the micro-credit programmes on the lives and 
living standards of the participants at the household level with a view to examining the 
efficacy of the programmes. The chapter builds on the premise that efficacy of financial 
service can be measured in terms of increase in the incomes and productivity of the 
programme participants as the micro credit programmes have emerged to help the poor 
become self-employed with the explicit objective of assisting them to escape from poverty. 
An alternative and indirect way of assessing the efficacy of such intervention is to examine 
the sustainability of the welfare of the programme participants.  This can be done  through 
measuring changes in the commonly used  welfare indicators,  such as children’s education, 
food consumption, contraceptive use and fertility behaviour and so on.  
While the main focus of the chapter is to highlight the  welfare of the programme 
participants,  it examines how the micro-credit interventions have impacted on the lives and 
living standards of the programme participants.  The  assessment of intra-household effects is 
captured in terms of schooling, food consumption, environmental health and sanitation, 
health, family planning, agricultural and non-farm employment and net worth.  
 4.2 Methodology 
The analysis is based on the data from a multipurpose household survey conducted for the 
study. The survey covered one village of each of the programmes – Grameen Bank (GB), 
BRAC, RD-12 and WFP assisted Food for Works programme. For making a comparative 
assessment, the survey covered both programme villages of each of the stated programmes 
and villages in which neither these programmes nor any other programmes providing credit 
or other activities including transfer mode operations were in execution. The respondents 
from the latter, what is termed as “control village,” was carefully selected from those who 
meet the eligibility criteria of becoming target households of these programmes.   
 
The unit of the survey is household, not individuals, so gender balance was deliberately 
maintained  in selecting the respondent households. The table below, thus shows that 
information was gathered both from male and female programme participants, reflecting 
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national population divide. Effort was made to maintain a balance between married and 
unmarried borrowers.  
 
Table 4.1: General Information about the Respondents 
{      
{ GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control 
Village 
Percentage of Male 55.2 51.4 51.2 53.6 51.3
Percentage of Female 44.8 48.6 48.8 46.4 48.7
Percentage of Married borrowers 42.9 54.3 42.9 45.9 46.0
Percentage of unmarried borrowers  50.9 44.0 52.7 52.1 50.3
Others 6.2 1.7 4.4 2.0 3.7
Source: Field Survey, 1998 
4.3  Educational Profile of the Households and Children’s Schooling 
 
The interventions  are seen to have created a significant impact on the educational profile of 
the households  when comparison is made between intervention village vis-a-vis control 
village. Around 90 per cent households of the programme villages know alphabets and can 
write while it is only around 60 per cent in the control village, although more than the 
national average (Table 4.2).  Average uneducated members per programme village is around 
2, with lowest in the public agency’s programme, while the rate is almost 70 per cent higher 
in control village.  
 
When asked about the reasons for not attending schools, most of them replied that they 
were compelled to engage themselves in household works in order to maintain their 
subsistence since childhood. Some felt that immediate marginal benefit of attending school is 
much less attractive especially against the backdrop wherin subsistence is at stake. The rate is 
astonishingly high among the control villagers (over70 per cent) in comparison to the 
programme villages. 
Table 4.2: Education Profile of the Respondents 
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control   
Village 
Percentage of H/H having educated 
members 
91.4 85.7 97.2 89.0 60.0 
Average uneducated member per H/H 2.2 2.1 2.4 1.5 3.4 
Reasons for not attending school      
    a.  Expenses 4 9 3 4 17 
    b. Helping H/H work 39 40 27 9 73 
    c. Distance 2 3 3 0 4 
    d. Parents did not ant 2 1 17 7 0 
    e. Others 13 3 0 18 7 
    Source: Field Survey, 1998 
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It is argued  that these programme interventions leave a significant impact on the 
schooling of the children.  The awareness and training programme associated with these type 
of programme interventions lead the programme participants to develop better lifestyle by 
making investments for educating their future generations. Thus they invest in future. The 
economic motive behind  making investments for the future generations is to develop human 
capital that not only would lead their children  to escape from poverty but also push them up 
to upper income levels. 
 
The findings of the present survey provide  support to the hypothesis as evident from  
Table 4.3. A comparative assessment of the investments made by  the programme village and 
the control village reveals  that the programme interventions play a  catalytic role in 
developing  future human capital. The BRDB- assisted households stand out as the  highest 
investors in the future (Tk. 4826 per household) while the control village households spend 
less than half of BRDB (Taka 2116 per household). 
 
Table 4.3: Expenses Incurred for Educational Purpose by the Households  
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control   
Village 
Percentage of H/H incur educational expenses 74.3 57.1 79.3 37.1 51.4
Average Admission, registration and tuition 
fees per H/H (tk.) 
850 615 352 668 276
Average cost for Clothing per H/H  (tk.) 746 1013 1081 1285 609
Average cost for books and statio. per H/H (tk) 514 828 695 958 353
Average conveyance per H/H  (tk.) 75 0 0 123 170
Average cost for private tutor per H/H (tk.) 1055 940 1223 1397 500
Average Examination fees per H/H  (tk.) 108 172 339 232 105
Average Other expenses per H/H 98 600 198 163 103
Average Total expenses per H/H  (tk.) 3446 4168 3888 4826 2116
Source: Field Survey, 1998 
Food Consumption 
 
The households of the participating programme villages except those in  Grameen Bank 
spend more money  than those of control villages on food in order to keep themselves 
nutritionally fit  for engaging in productive activities. Most of the food is procured from the 
sources outside the households, demonstrating lack of control over land and farm produces.  
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Table 4.4: Households Expenditure on Food (Monthly) 
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control   
Village 
Average Expenses for food per H/H   (Tk.) 114 2025 29557 2457 2189
Average amount spent per H/H for purchases 
of food outside H/H source   (Tk.) 
1385 1936 2097 1967 1792
Source: Field Survey, 1998 
4.4  Environmental Health and Sanitation 
 
The survey results showed  that hand pump is the major source of drinking water for every 
household. But when classified by ownership of the pumps, it is found that the  rate of 
ownership of hand pump by the members of GB, WFP and BRDB is  quite high in 
comparison to the programme participants of BRAC and the non-participants. Control 




In terms of use of sanitary latrines, a sharply contrasting picture emerges, showing that 
around 70 per cent of the programme participants use sanitary latrines while an insignificant 
6 per cent of the control villagers use the facility. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Profile of Environmental Health and Sanitation 
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control   Village 
Sources of drinking water (%)      
1. Hand pump (family) 65.7 22.9 80.0 74.3 31.4
2. Hand pump (Owned by others) 31.4 77.1 20.0 25.7 68.6
3. Open well 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4. Pond/River/ Canal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Percentage of H/H taking boiled water 2.9 2.9 11.4 11.4 2.9
Percentage of H/H using dustbin for garbage 44.0 37.0 43.0 88.0 83.0
Percentage of H/H using Sanitary Latrine 54.0 62.0 88.0 77.0 6.0
Source: Field Survey, 1998 
 
Sickness and Treatment 
 
The survey does not reveal any observable difference in terms of sickness reported and the 
sources of treatment used by the programme and the non-programme village households 
(Table 4.6).    
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   Table 4.6: General Information about Disease and Injuries 
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control   
Village 
Average number of sick members per H/H 1.8 1.6 2.8 3.2 1.6 
Average duration of illness (days) 12.5 10.6 9.4 9.0 12.0 
Percentage of affected taken medical 
treatment 
100.0 100.0 87.0 93.0 90.0 
Percentage did not seek medical advice 0.0 0.0 13.0 7.0 10.0 
Nature of treatment      
Mainstream (%) 74.0 100.0 92.0 85.0 85.0 
Homeopathy(%) 13.0 0.0 2.0 15.0 0.0 
Traditional/etc (%) 13.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 15.0 
Average days lost due to illness and injuries 19.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 17.0 
     Source: Field Survey, 1998 
Reproductive Health 
 
The percentage of households adopting family planning  remain almost equal across the 
board. It may be  because of the government being  the primary source of supply of  
contraception  devices of the households as reported in Table 4.7.  Although Grameen 
members are the largest users of the government supplied contraceptions, they spend also 
higher amounts for buying various contraceptives.  
 
Most of the pregnant mothers gave birth to their children at their houses with the help of 
the traditional birth attendants. There is no observable difference amongst the group on 
account of breast feeding also.  
 
Table 4.7: Profile of Reproductive Health  
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control  
Village 
Percentage of H/H adopted Family planning 62.9 68.6 88.6 77.1 65.7
Sources of Contraception  
1. Government 84.2 75.9 61.3 53.0 66.7
2. private 5.3 3.4 6.5 6.3 0
3. NGOs 10.5 32.2 40.7 33.3 20.7
Average expen. on contraception per H/H (Tk) 26.8 17.5 15.9 12.9 12.4
Place of birth of Children:  
House (%) 94.5 100.0 97.0 95.5 99.1
Private doctor/ Clinic (%) 0 0 0 0 0
Government Hospital (%) 1.1 0 0 2.7 0.9
Others (%) 4.4 0 3.0 1.8 0
Percentage of population breast feed 96.8 99.0 97.7 97.3 100
Source: Field Survey, 1998 
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Marriage and Children 
 
The average age at first marriage remains within teens, showing the trend of early marriage 
and disproving the recent claims about  the elevation in the age of marriage due to awareness 
created by these programmes. There is no significant difference between programme and 
non-programme villages in terms of the number of children, though they remain within two. 
This may be attributed to nation-wide decline in fertility due to government interventions. 
The other indicators of family life presented in Table 4.8 also do not reveal significant 
differences. 
    
Table 4.8: Profile of Marriage and Family Life 
Average number of married person per 
H/H 
GB BRAC WFP BRDB Contr
olVilla
ge 
Average age of first marriage 16.5 16.6 16.7 17.6 18.4
Average number of children per H/H 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.4 1.9
Average number of short-lived children 
per H/H 
1.4 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.5
Average number of still-birth children 
per H/H 
0 0 1.0 1.7 1.6
   Source: Field Survey, 1998 
4.5  Occupational Composition  
Table 4.9 shows that there is a shift towards self-employment from farm-employment, which 
may be attributed to programme intervention. This shift in the occupational pattern becomes 
especially marked from row three of the table where comparisons are made between the 
programme and the non-programme villages. In the control village, for example, the 
proportion of self-employed persons is only 51 percent  compared to 74 per cent  in the 
programme villages. However, still a  good number of household members work in 
agriculture while a portion of the respondents work as non-farm wage labourers.  The BRAC 
participants spend less time in agricultural activities.  
 








Control   
Village 
Average number of members per H/H 
working in agriculture 
1.1 .4 1.3 1.3 1.4
Average number of members per H/H 
working as non agricultural  labor  
1.6 1.3 1.5 1.6 1
Percentage of H/H having self employment 80 74 86 77 51




The BRAC members are hardly seen to engage themselves in agricultural activities, perhaps 
because of having little cultivable land per household. On the contrary, the  control villagers, 
perhaps not  finding any other alternatives,  employ themselves in large numbers in 
agricultural activities.  The control villagers and Grameen members have taken land on lease 
for share cropping. But the return on land varies between the two  A  GB household earn 
Taka 6999 by spending Taka 2115 in contrast to earning of Taka 2540 from an expenditure of 
Taka 808 by a control village household. 
Table 4.10: Households Profile of Agricultural Activities 
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control 
Village 
Percentage of H/H having agricultural activities 85.7 2.9 77.1 57.0 90.4 
Average cultivable land per H/H (decimal) 46.6 20.0 33.4 24.0 88.0 
Percentage of H/H taken land on lease for share cropping 57.0 2.9 45.7 8.6 87.4 
Average income per H/H from land (Tk) 6976 6100 2633 1860 2540 
Average expenditure per H/H for land (Tk) 2115 950 1422 678 808 
   Source: Field Survey, 1998 
4.6  Assets and Incomes 
 
There is significant  difference amongst the members  in terms of ownership of land used for 
the business, with the GB members having the least amount of land. Those who have 
acquired land, in case of GB member, it is purchased through credit while other programme 
members have done it through savings and other sources. Hardly anybody owns structures 
except one-third of the BRAC samples. The same is applicable in case of machines, 
instruments and other permanent assets required for businesses. 
 
The survey result shows that the lion’s share of the expenditure on production activities is 
spent on account of purchasing raw materials. In terms of irregular expenses, the rent for 
space tops the expenditure  categories as most of them continues to carry out their business 
on khash land or in hats, for which they paid  toll or most of the time evaded such payments..  
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Table 4.11: Assets of and Income from Non-agricultural Activities 
  
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control
Village 
% of H/H having own land for business 5.7 28.6 45.7 25.7 - 
Market price of average land owned for business per 
H/H 
4000 21833 26950 12900  
Means of acquiring land      
1.Own savings (%)  37.5 35.7 40  
2. Loan from friends/relatives (%) - - - - - 
Loan from MFI (%) 100 12.5 7.1   
Others (%)  50.0 57.2 60.0  
% of H/H own structure (House) 8.6 37.1 17.1 20.0 2.9
Average market price of such physical structures (Tk.) 9000 5714 4667 11833 2000 
Means of acquisition of the house - - - - - 
Machines/ Instrument/ Tools - - - - - 
%of H/H having own machines 2.9 20 25.7 11.4  
Average market price of machines and other 
equipment (Tk.) 
7000 6164 2548 5500  
Means of acquisition - - - - - 
1.Own savings (%) 100 66.7 75 40  
2. Loan from friends/relatives (%)      
Loan from MFI (%)  33.3  60  
Others (%)   25   
% of H/H having other permanent assets 11.4 42.9 40 42.9 57 
Average market prices of other permanent assets used 
for the business (Tk.) 
8250 5100 12321 11500 750 
Means of acquisition      
1.Own savings (%) 100 61.5 75 71.4  
2. Loan from friends/relatives (%)  7.7    
Loan from MFI (%)  30.8 8.3 21.4  
Others (%)   16.7 7.2  




Table 4.12 shows that average income from the non-farm activities ranges between Taka 
1580 to 2500 for the programme participants while it is only Taka 880 for the non-
participants. The implication is that availability of credit could raise the income of a 
participant by giving him access to necessary inputs and services. 
 
Table 4.12: Income from Non-Farm activities (Taka) 
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control Village 
Average monthly sale 6250 14817 20997 7704 3200
Average monthly income from NFA 1580 2700 2944 2563 880




The micro-credit intervention has succeeded in infusing savings habit among the poor, no 
mater how small the amount is. The survey reveals that programme participants of the BRDB 
have saved the highest amount on average while GB bottoms the list (Table 4.13).  
 
Table 4.13: Particulars related to Savings 
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control 
Village 
Average current market value of savings per H/H 490 1677 1038 2751 300
Average amount withdrawn from the account 285 0 180 0 0
Average amount saving in the programs of group 
accounts per H/H 
499 1706 1097 1599 0
      Source: Field Survey, 1998 
4.7  Before-After Comparison of Assets 
 A before-after comparison of  asset holding by the sample households was made and the 
results are presented in Table 4.14. While any dramatic shifts not revealed in the  command  
over resources, especially in terms of fixed assets,  it becomes evident  that three is almost no 
change in terms of ownership of land holdings. However, it was not measured what would 
have happened in land ownership without the programme intervention.   
 
The small changes that can be  observed relating to asset holding by the programme 
participants are more visible in terms of resources such as equipment and instruments.  
 
Table 4.14: A Before-After Comparison of Assets 
Category GB BRAC WFP BRDB 
 before after before after before after before after 
Average decimal of homestead per H/H 10 10 11 10 15 16 9 9 
Average decimal of ponds/ chastens /gardens per H/H 10 10 20 20 14 18 9 9 
Average decimal of cultivable land per H/H 43 43 1 1 33 31 29 32 
Average decimal of share cropped per H/H  38 22 92 92 85 60 10 10 
Average decimal of other owned land per H/H 0 0 10 12 10 12 13 13 
Total value (average)per H/H (Tk.) 97878 97878 29632 30028 56102 61571 81398 83182 
Average market price of Bicycle/motorbike per H/H (Tk) 3875 3000 1900 1583 1000 8833 1750 2000 
Average market price of boats/ Rickshaw per H/Hn (Tk) 0 0 2500 4500 3000 2500 5000 4500 
Average market price of pushcart/horse drawn carraige per H/H (Tk) 0 0 0 0 0 2000 0 0 
Average market price of other transportation per H/H (Tk) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Average price of processing implements per H/H (Tk) 275 900 2500 4500 200 400 150 200 
Average price of perimeters per H/H  (Tk.) 240 387 400 400 275 425 113 276 
Average price of radio/tape recorder/TV etc per H/H (Tk) 440 1168 7000 1329 0 1212 2210 2300 
Average price of gold/silver ornamentsper H/H (Tk) 2687 2661 3086 2955 2050 2803 1500 2957 
Average market price of Machines/ Industries per H/H (Tk) 1782 1859 1021 1858 1042 1974 1791 3166 
Average market price of House per H/H (Tk) 4038 10235 8485 9941 9125 1106 9759 12815 
Average market price of other assets per H/H  (Tk) 1765 3182 2223 3709 1594 5441 1436 2566 
Source: Field Survey, 1998 
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Chapter   5 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF A GOVERNMENT SAFETY  
NET PROGRAMME : THE CASE OF FFEP 
 
5.0  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the safety net programmes introduced and implemented by the 
Government from time to time to achieve both transfer payment and human capital 
accumulation objectives. There is a long tradition of using the  safety net programmes for the 
poor, funded by external food aid. The three largest programmes are Food for Work (FFW), 
which provides wheat in exchange for work in rural infrastructure projects, Vulnerable Group 
Development (VGD), which provides food grain and training to disadvantaged women, and 
Food for Education (FFEP), which initially provided wheat and now provides wheat and rice 
to poor children in return for regular primary school attendance.   
 
The present chapter attempts to explore the efficacy of FFEP as this is the relatively new 
and fast growing programme.  FFW and VGD are already well researched and there exits 
substantial knowledge base about these. The discussion is organised in three sub-sections.  
Section I highlights the school enrolment on a before-after comparison basis and analyses 
internal efficiency of primary education in “non-food” and FFEP schools, using such 
indicators  as enrolment, attendance, dropout and repeat. The second sub-section analyses 
impact of the FFEP at household level including incidence on child labour and knowledge 
and perception about FFEP. The final section again from macro perspective comprehends the 
cost-effectiveness of FFEP and ends with a comparison of efficacy of such transfers. 
 
The household level information was collected through a small survey. The programme 
level efficacy has been analysed using secondary data as such analysis requires gathering 
information from a sizeable sample for which enough resources were not available. 
 
5.1 A Short Background to FFEP 
The FFEP started in at least one  union of each of the 460 thanas in Bangladesh in 1993-94, 
with the objective of encouraging poor families to send in their children  to primary schools 
and sustain them there  in exchange for  food given as income entitlement. The programme 
expanded steadily and the gradual increase in coverage reached at 1243 unions  (Table 5.1) in 
1995-96. About 19,62, 496 families of 22,39,805 students of 16,159 schools have benefited 
under FFEP during 1995-96 (Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1: Progress of FFEP at a Glance 
Period FFEP Coverage 











































Note: Figures in the parentheses indicate percent of total number in the country; * In 1996-97, the same unions 
and schools as was covered in 1995-96 have been covered. The number of students may rise during the 
period, however. 
 
Source: BIDS (1997) based on Project Implementation Unit, FFEP, Dhaka, May 2, 1997 
 
5.2  Impact of  FFEP on  Internal Efficiency of the School System 
 
The underlying objective of the FFEP has been improvement of the primary education system 
in general. The performance indicators such as enrolment, drop-out and repeat rate reflect the 
health of school, which essentially records mobility of the school in terms of sustainability.  
 
Table 5.2 shows that FFEP schools perform better in terms of enrolment and attendance 
rate. On the remaining two variables – drop-out and repeaters’ rate – the evidence is at best 
mixed. No clear picture emerges and can not be said that FFEP schools are performing better. 
 
Table 5.2: Indicators of Internal Efficiency of Primary Education in “Non-Food and 
















































Note: Estimates of girls are given in the parentheses 
 
Source: Compiled from BIDS (1997) 
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                  Pupil dropping out in the year (t) in grade (i) 
Dropout Rate X = -----------------------------------------------------------  x   100 it  
                                      Total enrolment in the year (t) in grade (i) 
 
          Pupil repeating in the same grade (i) at the begining of the next year (t+1) 
Repeaters Rate Rit  = ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x 100 
                                           Total enrolment in the year (t) in grade (i)   
  
 
The BIDS (1997) study analysed the performance of FFEP schools without and with 
FFEP interventions over two years time horizon. The “without” was measured using the data 
of the preceding year of intervention while the successive year i.e. the year FFEP was 
introduced in school was treated as “with.”  The study found that enrolment size has gone up 
in both sample grades I and IV during the “with” year. Moreover, the contrasting “with” and 
“without” situation shows that enrolment of girls students has increased at a higher pace.  
 
Table 5.3: Internal efficiency of Primary Education in FFEP Schools in “Without” and 
“With” Situations 
Enrolment (number) Grade 
without With 








Source: BIDS (1997) 
In the FFEP schools enrolment has gone up by almost 14 per cent while total enrolment in 
non-food school has hovered between 2.56 per cent to 5.96 per cent in both phases. However, 
it is also seen from the Table 5.4 that the enrolment-growth rate in FFEP schools during pre-
FFEP period was much higher that those of non-food school. It leaves the question of 
selectivity bias open. Moreover, it also raises the question whether targeting was done in 
proper directions. 
 
 Table 5.4: A Before-After Comparison of Changes in School Enrolment 
Percentage Change in total 
enrolment 
FFEP Intervention Phase Category of Schools 
Before FFEP After FFEP 
Non-food Schools 5.05 (8.55) 5.96 (2.05)First Phase Unions 
FFEP Schools 30.27 (39.52) 13.85 (16.49)
Non-food Schools 2.56 (4.76)  (-)1.38 (0.75)Second Phase Unions 
FFEP Schools 19.46 (23.02) 12.99 (13.44)
Note: The percentage changes in girls’ students are shown in the parentheses.  




Lessons from Household Levels 
 
For the purpose of the present chapter, a small survey was conducted where two schools were 
selected on random basis. The survey was conducted on the beneficiaries of FFEP. The 
purpose of the perception survey was to explore whether the programme benefit is reaching 
the target group and whether the members of participating households are satisfied with the 
programme. The general profile of the respondents are given below: 
 
 
     Table 5.5 : A General Profile of the Respondent Households 
Category Average/Percentage 
Average No. of Children 2.1 
Percentage of Boys 49.4 
Percentage of girls 50.6 
Percentage of Children attend Schools 73.0 
Percentage of Children benefit from FFEP 75.9 
Percentage of Boys benefiting from FFEP  53.7 
Percentage of Girls benefiting from FFEP 46.3 
    Source: Field Survey, 1998 
The survey findings reveal that benefiting children comes from the poor households. As 
observed from Table 5.6, over 90 per cent of the heads of the households are agricultural 
labourers and landless engaged in various seasonal occupations. However, it is unclear 
whether the programme is reaching the poorest of the poor since that requires a 
comprehensive and focused investigation.        
 
Table 5.6: Professional Distribution of FFEP Benefiting Households 
Profession Percentage 
Agricultural Labourer 40.0 
Landless engaged in various seasonal employment 51.1 
Artisan and Craftsman 5.7 
Petty trading 3.2 
 
Incidence on Child Labour 
 
The FFEP has left positive bearing on involvement of child labour, especially at the 
household level. The survey reveals that a portion of the children is now engaged in regular 
and seasonal employment, indicating a trend of abolition of child labour (Table 5.7). 
However, it is unclear whether FFEP acted as the key determinant in the near abolition of the 
incidence of child labour.  
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 Table 5.7: Impact of FFEP on Child Labour 
Incidence of Child Labour Percentage 
Not working as child labour  73.0 
Working everyday as child labour 7.0 
Occupationally working as child labour 11.4 
Seasonally working as child labour 8.6 
Source: Field Survey, 1998 
5.3  Perception about FFEP 
While nearly two-thirds of the sample households are aware of their entitlement, a  sizeable 
portion of the participating households (34.3) is not aware about how much  of food grain 
they are entitled, (Table 5.8) leaving room for leakage and pilferage. Another representative 
sample complained about the allocation process and they (28.6) are of the opinion that they 
do not receive the allotted amount in due time, putting extra burden on the households’ 
consumption level. The lower income tier within the programme participants sells a portion 
of their entitlement to market place for meeting other necessities.  
 
However, most of the participants are satisfied with the introduction of FFEP stating that 
this has supplemented their income level. An overwhelming majority of the programme 
participants wants the entitlement in  ‘cash’  instead of  ‘kind’.  
 
Table 5.8: Knowledge and Perception about FFEP 
Issue Indicator Percentage 
Aware 65.7 Knowledge about allocation 
Note aware 34.3 
Receive 71.4 Receive allocation at due time 
Do Not Receive 28.6 
Receive 91.4 Receive the total allocation 
Do Not Receive 8.6 
Sell 8.6 Sell at market 
Do not sell 91.4 
Satisfaction Satisfied 97.1 
Want cash benefit  77.1 
Source: Field Survey, 1998 
 
5.4 Cost-Effectiveness of FFEP 
 
The BIDS (1997) study measures cost-effectiveness of the FFEF programme by identifying 
cost in terms of purchase and delivery cost and benefit through income actually received by 
the target households and finds that the cost of transferring TK 1.00 worth of income benefits 
varies from Tk. 1.51 to Tk. 1.12 under different assumptions. 
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Table 5.9: Cost-Effectiveness of FFEP, 1995-96 
Item Estimates 
COSTS (Lakh Tk.)  
Foodgrain 22236.40 
Delivery 1085.00 
Total Cost (Lakh Tk.) 23321.40 
BENEFITS 
Leakage (percent)  
i) strict assumption 30.5 
ii) Liberal assumption 6.1 
  
Income (Lakh Tk)  
i) strict assumption 15454.3 
ii) Liberal assumption 20880.0 
  
Cost/Income Transferred  
i) strict assumption 1.51 
ii) Liberal assumption 1.21 
Source: BIDS(1997) 
 
A comparative assessment of cost effectiveness of FFEP with other food-based 
programme finds FFEP as the most cost-effective safety net programme (Table 5.10).  
Table 5.10: Cost-Effectiveness of Food-based Programmes 
Programme Cost of Transferring Tk 1.00 worth of income benefit (Tk.) 
Rural Rationing (former) 6.55 
Vulnerable Group Development(VGD) 1.68 
Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP) 1.32 
Food for Work (CARE) 2.81 
Food for Work (WFP) 2.06 
Food for Education (FFEP) 1.12 – 1.51 
Source: IFPRI (1994) and BIDS 
 
FFEP is the fastest growing safety net programme, accounting for 43 per cent of the 
primary education budget in 1997-98 Annual Development Programme (ADP). Analyses 
have shown that the FFEP has augmented primary school enrolment by almost 25 times and 
has been found to be the most cost-effective safety net programme in terms of its positive 
impacts on several directions,  although the issue of targeting has remained biased and to an 
extent imperfect.  
  
The FFEP has increased enrolment and attendance, but failed to make headway on two 
critical quality indicators – drop-out rate and repeaters. When sustainability is considered,  
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these two indicators leave room for significant  improvements and drastic redesign of the 
programme. Better targeting is urgently required.  
 
5.5 Some Probing into the Differences in Socio-Economic Conditions of the 




In order to map out the impact of micro-credit intervention in the survey areas the present 
study adopted the ‘survey village’  versus  ‘control village’ and  ‘before – after’ comparisons 
within the survey villages.  Although it is difficult to posit casual links between loan use and 
changes in income levels due to fungibility of credit and money in general, our survey results 
reveal several import changes in the socio-economic conditions of the program participants 
vis-à-vis the non-participants although the differences identified through before-after 




The important reasons underlying such changes may be attributed to a number of 
economic and non-economic factors. The economic reason of low-retained incomes by the 
survey households may stem from small size of loan, lack of economies of scale in the 
sectors choosen by the borrowers to invest and small gains in productivity. The small size of 
loan absence of economies of scale, and low productivity appear to be putting downward 




The second distinctive difference between the program villages and control groups is seen 
in terms of progress made by the program villagers in respect of human resources 
development indicators.  The survey results reveal that the difference is to be attributed to 
program intervention and not to the differences in the initial conditions of program and 
control villages. The plausible explanation lies in these programs’ approaches to 
development. The program strategy clearly tries to take into cognisance the need for a 
‘holistic’ development approach  putting emphasis on human and sustainable development, 
though concepts and implementation plan in their programs may appear to be less clear and 
sometimes conflicting.  In most cases, apart from delivery of  credit, the MFI activities also 
include : 
 
 institution-building through forming groups and village organisations 
 functional education courses given to the borrowers before they start taking credit  
 skill training 
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 a para-legal training course in which training explain legal stipulations relating to 
marriage, divorce, land rights, etc. 
 a health awareness program in which they are made familiar with issues pertaining to 
primary health care and child and maternal health care, etc. 
 
 
All these are elements of orientation training given to the loanees which is designed to 






Chapter  6 
Programme Sustainability : A Comparative Assessment of  GB, 
BRAC and BRDB Programmes 
 
6.0  Introduction 
This  chapter attempts to explore the programme level sustainability of the micro-credit 
programmes. The programme level sustainability is examined  through analysing the  
income-expenditure structures of the programme and estimating financial efficiency 
indicators,  break-even interest rate and subsidy dependence index (SDI). A credit 
programme may be considered on the way towards sustainability when  its income structure 
deepends on interest income while operating expenses gradually decline. A credit delivery 
programme is cost-efficient when cost of delivery decreases over time. The over-riding 
concern of these programmes is their external dependence. Finally, a programme may  be 
considered being  on the way towards self-reliance if the rate of dependence, captured 
through SDI, shows a downward trend. Based on these indices, we attempt to examine 
programme sustainability of GB,BRAC and  the BRDB.  It is noted once again that the 
figures obtained from the MFIs concerned    and used here to estimate various indices might 
be affected by usual statistical limitations and hence affect our results.  
 
6.1  Grameen Bank 
 
Income Structure 
An analysis of the income structure of the Grameen Bank (Table 6.1) shows that the Bank 
was highly dependent on donations and government allocations for its incomes at an average 
of 80 per cent till 1995.  From 1996 onward,  the MFI’s income emanating from interest 
jumped to 60 per cent from a range between 10 to 20 percent, indicating a silver lining in 





















































































Note   :   Figures in the parentheses denote percentage of the row. 
 
When annual growth rate of programme income structure is decomposed, a disturbing 
picture emerges till 1993, with dependency on donors’ contribution rising even as high as 93 
per cent in 1993 compared to that of previous year (Table 6.2).  The trend took a reversal 
since 1994 with 16 percent decline from the previous year and reaching to best year of 1996, 
when donors’ contribution nose dived to a negative of  85 per cent from the previous year.  It 
can be argued that the scene is not that irksome when growth rate of interest rate is taken into 
account as opposed to donation since there is a secular increase of interest income till 1993. 
But the growth rate of interest income shows a marked decline from 1995 and reaches  a 
negative figure of 13.66 per cent in 1997.  Similar trend is also noticeable in case  of income 
from donation and government allocations. Therefore, the result can  at best be summed as 
mixed, with a tilt towards dependency in terms of growth rate and efforts towards increasing 
















1989 48.37 43.60 - - - 47.88 
1990 36.06 42.01 - - - 36.61 
1991 13.10 40.44 - - - 15.98 
1992 33.97 48.71 - - - 35.85 
1993 93.24 74.85 - - - 90.68 
1994 -16.09 56.16 - - - -6.86 
1995 21.27 13.77 - - - 20.86 
1996 -84.60 0.62 - - 15.50 -66.41 
1997 -13.75 -13.66 - - 19.58 -12.55 
     Source :  Table 6.1 
 
Operating Expenses 
A closer look at programme level operating expenses suggests that operating expenses in 
every head has increased due to expansion of coverage. If an item-wise expenditure  
comparison is made, the increase in staff cost appears to have elbowed out other sectors 
(Table 6.3).  
 
Table 6.3 :  Programme-Level Operating Expenses (Mill Tk.) 
 
Category 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Staff  Cost 48.08 121.17 170.84 268.62 389.19 579.74 587.72 708.83 663.4 931.75 
Target Group 27.73 38.73 48.00 50.34 89.03 235.49 522.53 478.35 103.7 372.62 
Training 24.6 63.28 79.36 60.45 44.58 47.86 46.21 39.07 42.8 25.3 
Recurring Expenditure 44.08 104.29 157.14 187.86 292.81 539.19 1061.4 691.33 - - 
Head Office - 40.2 50.41 91.96 153.36 300.93 570.97 - - - 
Revolving Fund 67.2 30.76 1024.5 1278.1 2383.5 2827.8 3089.3 3471.9 1188.8 1012.34 
Source:  Various Annual Report 
 
Increasingly, the GB is trying to allocate resources for developing productive target 
groups through providing training (Table 6.4). The trend growth rate may be assumed to be 
secular. The revolving fund remains almost stagnant from 1990 with little ups and downs. 
 
Table 6.4 :  Annual Growth Rate of Programme-level Operating Expenses  
Category 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Staff Cost 152.02 40.99 57.23 44.88 48.96 1.38 20.61 -6.41 40.45 
Target Group 39.67 23.93 4.88 76.86 164.51 121.89 -8.46 -78.32 259.32 
Training 157.23 222.6 145.7 81.2 94.5 87.8 58.8 74 -2.80 
Recurring 
Expenditure 
136.6 256.5 326.2 564.3 1123.2 2307.8 1468.4 - - 
Head Office 40.2 25.4 128.8 2811.5 648.6 1320.3 - - - 





Financial efficiency is captured here through measuring cost of delivery, unit cost of 
coverage and break even interest.  Table 6.5 shows that cost of delivery has not declined from 
the initial 1989 period,  rather has increased to a peak of 0.76 in 1997. The unit cost of 
coverage has also increased over the years except for the last three years under study,  leaving 
a negative mark on the financial viability of the programme.   
 
Table 6.5 :  Comparative Financial Efficiency Indicators 
 




211.69 398.43 1530.74 1937.3 3352.46 4830.99 5877.55 5389.49 1998.7 2342.05 
B.  Revolving 
Fund (mill Tk) 
67.2 30.76 1024.49 1278.1 2383.49 2827.78 3089.27 3471.85 2651 1012.38 








D. Cost of 
Delivery  
(B/A, in Tk) 
0.32 0.08 0.67 0.66 0.71 0.59 0.53 0.64 1.11 0.76 
E. Cost of 
Coverage 
(A/C, in Tk) 
432.02 603.68 1759.47 1810.6 2360.89 2683.88 2938.76 1996.11 882.93 582.52 
Source :  Various Annual Reports and Balance Sheets 
 
 The estimates for break-even interest rates required for viability are computed on the 
basis of the following equation (Mosley, 1993): 
     
                                                 i+a+p 
r =--------------- 
    1+p 
where : 
 
 i = interest rate per unit of borrowed principal 
a = administrative cost per unit of funds loaned out 
p = default rate 
 
The application of the equation to the GB data results in an average interest rate of 18 per 





Table: 6.6 :   Estimates of Break-even Interest Rate 
Category 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
i 13.04 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.0326 0.040 0.0557 0.056 0.068 0.068
a 209.53 0.99 1.43 2.11 1.08 1.07 1.42 1.74 1.74 1.81
p 0.031 0.031 0.046 0.070 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.054 0.039 0.036





The subsidy dependence index can be calculated using equations of Yaron (1992).  
Subsidy (S) is defined as:  
  A(m – c) + {(E * m) – p}K 
Where, 
   S = annual subsidy received by the programme 
   A = concessional borrowed funds outstanding 
   m = interest rate that the programme would be assumed to pay for borrowed funds if  access  
to concessional borrowed funds was eliminated 
   c = concessional rate of interest rate actually paid on concessional borrowed funds  
outstanding 
    E = average annual equity 
    K = sum of all other subsidies received 
 
Subsequently, the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) is estimated as: 
     S 
  SDI = ----------    
   LP * i 
Where, 
    LP = average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the programme 
     i   = average on-lending interest rate paid on loan portfolio of the programme  
 
Table 6.7 shows that during the reported ten years GB has received an average annual 
subsidy of Tk 40 million. The trend is, however, disturbing as it shows a secular increase in 
absolute terms. In case of GB, the SDI estimate that an average increase of 100 percent in 
lending rate would have been required to eliminate all subsidies during the reported period. 
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Table: 6.7 :  Estimates of Subsidy Dependence Index 
Years A (Tk m) M(%) C(%m) E (Tkm) P (Tk m) K(Tkm) LP(Tk m) I(%) S(Tk m) SDI (Tk m) 
1988 1413.52 8 6.5 14.63 1.17 0 1379.49 1.13 21.20 136 
1989 2097.3 8 6.2 28.25 2.26 0 2217.46 1.12 37.75 152 
1990 1855.3 8 6.7 38.75 3.10 0 1216.71 1.12 24.12 177 
1991 2334.3 8 7.8 149 11.92 0 286.47 1.14 4.67 143 
1992 3487.6 8 7.3 70.63 5.65 0 1845.75 1.15 24.41 115 
1993 6593.8 8 7.5 122.38 9.79 0 3893.48 1.16 32.97 073 
1994 9908.6 8 7.8 270 21.6 0 7700.08 1.17 19.82 022 
1995 11115.9 8 7.5 185.88 14.87 0 8411.02 1.18 55.58 056 
1996 12015.5 8 7.25 237.5 19 0 7793.15 1.18 90.12 098 
1997 12429.4 8 7.25 187.5 15 0 6475.41 1.18 93.22 122 




6.2  BRAC 
Income Structure 
 
A closer look at the income structure of the BRAC’s RDP programme reveals that the 
programme remains highly dependent on donors contribution at an average of 70 per cent of 
the total income (Table 6.8). The income from the programme emanating through interest 
remains stagnated at an average of about 11 per cent of the total income. 
 
 































































































Note:      Figures in the parentheses denote percentage of the row. 
Source :  Various Annual Reports 
 
When annual growth rate of programme level cost structure is decomposed, the donors 
contribution grew  by 279.47 per cent in 1990 over  that of the preceding year.  After 
declining for three subsequent years, it is seen to have picked up again, reaching  a record 
high of 329.24 per cent in 1994 (Table 6.9). For the next year the growth rate took a reversal 
and again increased only by 25.59 per cent in 1997. During the period 1991-1995, the annual 
growth rate of interest income was positive, registering   record increase in 1993. From 1995, 
income from internal source shows a rising trend with a dive in 1996.  












1990 279.47 -71.72 - - - 130.81 
1991 2.74 12.92 - - - 2.94 
1992 1.68 17.36 - - - 2.02 
1993 -55.60 1384.39 33.20 7.33 925.00 143.93 
1994 329.24 33.04 45.93 3.27 -79.9 13.13 
1995 -25.04 36.59 -80.24 47.15 104.73 -0.55 
1996 -10.62 -68.92 77.85 - -30.70 -29.69 
1997 25.59 48.88 -86.72 - -51.44 8.58 




Head-wise yearly comparison of programme level operating expenses suggests that operating 
expenses in every head has increased due to expansion of coverage with some yearly 
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fluctuations (Table 6.10). The major share of operating expenses is devoted to target group. 
Staff cost and recurrent expenditures have taken significant shares of the operating expenses.  
 
Table:  6.10 :   Programme-level Operating Expenses 
(mill Tk) 
Category 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Staff Cost 18.12 29.14 28.40 86.77 299.86 307.23 421.39 142.01 170.73 
Target Cost 39.45 49.1 56.20 85.62 536.1 511.4 518.3 42.33 38.92 
Training 3.10 7.72 10.60 18.60 72.32 70.98 38.27 10.45 12.75 
Recurring 
Expenditure 
29.75 40.75 46.32 41.78 225.75 285.41 286.08 337.33 372.48 
Head Office 7.33 14.1 17.04 14.10 43.8 40.16 41.18 14.91 18.47 
Revolving  Fund 115.5 121.54 121.54 121.54 243.79 168.3 269.27 580.02 593.74 
Total 213.25 263.25 280.15 398.41 1421.53 1383.78 1604.49 1127.1 1207.09 
 Source:  Various Annual Reports 
 
The decomposition of annual growth rate of programme-level operating expenditure 
(Table 6.11) does not show any clear trend. It is assumed that the programme moves  towards 
self-sufficiency, if the overhead cost shows a declining trend. In BRAC’s case staff cost 
appears to increase monotonously almost every year till 1995, although expenses on head 
office shows a reversal from 1993. With some fluctuations, the  recurrent expenditure 
demonstrates a secular growth trend.  
 
Table:  6.11 :   Annual Growth Rate of Programme-level Operating Expenses 
(Percent) 
Category 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Staff Cost 60.82 -2.54 205.53 245.58 2.46 37.16 -66.30 20.22
TargetGroup 24.46 14.46 52.35 526.26 -6.61 1.35 -91.83 -8.06
Training 149.03 37.31 75.47 288.82 -1.85 -46.08 -72.69 22.01
Recurring 
Expenditure 
36.97 13.67 54.97 214.50 26.43 0.234 17.91 10.42
Head Office 92.36 20.85 -17.25 214.50 -8.31 2.54 -63.79 23.88
Revolving Fund 5.23 - - 100.58 30.97 59.99 115.40 2.37
Total  23.45 6.40 42.24 256.80 -2.66 15.95 -29.76 7.10
Source:  Table 6.1 
Financial Efficiency 
 
Table 6.12 which represents cost of delivery and unit cost of coverage shows that cost of 
delivery has remained almost same, at around 0.50,  barring the successful period of 1993 - 
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1995 when cost of delivery went down to a low of 0.12.  The unit cost of coverage shows a 
mixed trend, not indicating favourable trend in terms of financial efficiency. 
 
Table 6.12 :   Comparative Financial Efficiency Indicators 
(mill Tk) 
Category 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
A.  Total Exp. (mill 
tk) 
213.25 263.25 280.15 398.41 1421.53 1383.78 1604.49 1127.05 1207.09 
B. Revolving  
Fund (mill tk) 
115.5 121.54 121.54 121.54 243.79 168.3 269.27 580.02 593.74 
C.Number of  
Members (cummul.) 
0.20 0.35 0.46 0.65 0.80 1.2 1,08 1.5 1.8 
C. Cost of Delivery 
(B/A,in tk) 
0.54 0.46 0.43 0.31 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.51 0.43 
D.Cost of Coverage 
(A/C,in tk) 
1066.25 752.14 609.02 612.94 1776.91 1153.15 1485.64 751.53 670.61 
Source :   Various Annual Report and Balance Sheets  
 
The estimates for break-even interest rate, computed on the basis of the Mosley (1993) 
equation, reaches  an annual average of 30 per cent (Table 6.13).  The implication is that to 
make the programme financially viable a minimum of 30 per cent rate of interest has to be 
charged from the borrowers.  
 
Table: 6.13 :   Estimates for Break-even Interest Rate(s) 
Category 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
i 0.0145 0.0154 0.0158 0.0173 0.0146 0.0068 0.0075 0.0083 0.0078 
a 1.3 2.5 3.28 2.71 1.43 0.57 0.62 1.45 1.61 
p 0.02 0.050 0.070 0.051 0.050 0.029 0.028 0.06 0.06 
r 38.5 39.47 39.25 40.67 23.16 16.99 18.5 22.25 24.75 
 Note   :  i=interest rate per unit of borrowed principal by the organization, 
               a=administrative cost per unit of funds loaned out 
               p=default rate 




The subsidy dependence index, measured by Yaron equation (1992) suggests that an average 
increase of 184 percent in RDP lending rate would have been required to eliminate all 
subsidies during the reported period (Table 6.14).  This is a huge target to be achieved.  
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1989 120.73 8 5.08 343.7 28.38 0 1010.2 0.15 3.53 2.33 
1990 312.22 8 6.09 393.4 31.47 0 1558.5 0.16 5.96 2.39 
1991 487.7 8 6.95 604.6 48.37 0 1333.4 0.16 5.12 2.40 
1992 649.0 8 7.01 731.4 58.51 0 1833.8 0.21 6.43 1.67 
1993 847.6 8 7.26 1467.3 117.38 0 1485.5 0.21 6.27 2.01 
1994 1252.0 8 7.43 2041.8 163.34 0 3006.6 0.19 7.14 1.25 
1995 834.18 8 7.75 2112.4 168.99 0 805.8 0.19 2.08 1.36 
1996 912.83 8 6.95 2342.3 187.38 0 3110.7 0.20 9.58 1.54 
1997 1279.0 8 6.57 2072.2 165.78 0 5154.7 0.21 18.29 1.69 
Source :   Estimated based on various Annual Reports and Balance Sheets 
S=A(m-c)+(E*m=P)K 
Where, 
S= annual subsidy received by the programme 
A= concessional borrowed funds outstanding 
M= interest rate the programme would be assumed to kpayfor borrowed funds if access to concessional 
borrowed  
funds was estimated 
C= concessional rate of interest actually paid concessional borrowed funds outstanding 
E= average annual equity 
K= sum of all other subsidies received 
 
LP= average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the programme 
I= average on-lending interest rate paid on loan portfolio of the programme. 
                S 
SDI =     --- 
               LPxi 
 
6.3  BRDB 
Income Structure 
 
A look at the income structure of the BRDB’s RD-12 programme reveals that the programme 
remained totally dependent on government allocation and donors’ contributions till 1993 with  
little variations (Table 6.15) in some years. The share of income from the programme started 
rising from 1993 and reached at its peak in 1996. 
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- - 131.46 
(100) 
Note   :  Figures in the Parentheses denote percentage of the row 
 
When annual growth rate of programme level income structure is decomposed, the 
outside contribution shows ups and downs (Table 6.16). The internal resources shows an 
upward mobility till 1994, with its peak in the same year. For the latter three years, the trend 
is mixed, however. 
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1989 -3.8 - - - - -3.76 
1990 41.08 - - - - 83.2 
1991 49.06 - 66.67 - - 22.42 
1992 -1.09 - 10.00 - - -7.26 
1993 -8.88 - 17.10 - - 2.66 
1994 -48.91 - 309.37 - - 5.63 
1995 -40.22 - -56.14 - - -47.16 
1996 139.85 - 172.31 - - 151.59 
1997 -42.04 - -87.62 - - -38.46 




Head-wise yearly comparison of programme level operating expenses suggests that the major 
share has been appropriated by the staff salary (Table 6.17). The second largest share of 
operating expenses is devoted to target group coverage.  
 
Table 6.17:   Programme-level Operating Expenses 
           (mill Tk) 
Category 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Staff Cost 13.75 20.71 39.68 40.8 43.144 43.18 40.12 49.10 48.00 44.00 





19.78 21.50 20.20 
Training 2.87 3.97 11.24 12.40 27.91 27.75 15.32 9.25 12.60 15.00 
12.22 21.20 27.78 28.73 18.10 15.75 21.40 15.90 16.26 
Head office 1.75 2.00 8.96 8.74 8.36 3.00 2.75 3.24 3.6 
Revolving Fund 14.6 10.99 15.19 29.1 19 15.53 22.70 47.68 27.96 25.7 
Total 55.96 66.64 121.02 144.30 154.86 135.96 115.14 149.9 129.2 124.76 
 
Although decomposition of annual growth rate of programme-level operating expenditure 
(Table 6.18) does not show any clear trend, the  spending on staff has begun to decline from 
1993. The recurrent expenditure also demonstrates almost a secular declining trend since 
1993.  This is an encouraging trend towards better financial management. 
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Table 6.18 :   Annual Growth Rate of Programme-level Operating Expenses 
(percent) 
Category 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Staff Cost `50.62 91.6 2.82 5.75 .092 -7.09 22.38 -2.24 -8.33 
Target Group -12.17 130.23 2.75 9.01 0.65 -34.59 8.38 8.7 -6.05 
Training 38.33 
35.87 -25.70 2.26 
110.04 
Total 
183.12 10.32 125.08 -0.57 -34.59 -39.62 36.22 19.05 
Recurring 
Expenditure 
13.67 73.49 31.04 3.42 -37 -12.98 
Head Office 14.29 348 -2.46 -1.6 -58.13 -14.29 -8.33 17.82 11.11 
Revolving Fund -24.73 38.22 91.84 -34.8 -18.26 46.17 -41.36 -8.08 
16.99 81.60 18.20 8.26 -12.72 -14.81 30.19 -13.81 -3.44 




Table 6.19 which presents data on cost of delivery and unit cost of coverage shows that the 
unit cost of coverage has declined, almost steadily.  This speaks of achieving  of financial 
efficiency overtime. The cost of delivery has also remained stable at around 0.20, showing a 
leadership amongst the three programmes in terms of cost-efficiency.   
 
 
Table 6.19 :  Comparative Financial Efficiency Indicators 
(mill Tk) 
Category 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
A.Total exp. (mill tk) 55.96 66.64 121.02 144.30 154.86 135.96 115.14 149.9 129.2 124.76 
B.Revolving  
Fund  (mill tk) 
14.6 10.99 15.19 29.146 19.00 15.53 22.75 47,689 27.96 25.7 
C. Number of 
Members (cum.) 
0.12 0.15 
0.11 0.20 0.32 0.22 0.21 
267.81 
0.20 0.29 0.35 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.44 
D. Cost of Delivery 
(B/A,in tk) 
0.26 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.12 
E. Cost of Coverage 
(A/C,in tk) 
474.67 444.27 605.1 493.28 442.46 314.33 333.11 269.17 283.55 
Source:  Various Annual Reports and Balance Sheets 
 
The estimates for break-even interest rate, computed on the basis of the Mosley (1993) 




Table 6.20 :  Estimates for Break-even Interest Rate 
(percent) 
Category 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
i 0.045 0.050 0.047 0.039 0.015 0.073 0.024 0.067 0.032 
a 1.37 1.23 1.29 1.596 1.596 3.15 2.21 2.087 1.23 
p 0.06 0.02 0.025 0.047 0.056 0.07 0.072 0.03 0.04 
r 16.03 18.60 18.92 19.56 23.49 23.04 24.05 22.52 18.09 
Source:  Authors’ Calculation based on BRDB Documents. 
Note:     i= interest rate per unit of borrowed principal by the organization, 
           a=administrative cost per unit of funds loaned out 
           p=default rate 





The subsidy dependence index, measured by Yaron equation (1992) suggests that  the BRDB 
has received an annual subsidy of 10 million Taka per year (Table 6.21). Thus on most 
counts, the BRDB programme tends to demonstrate relatively better possibilities to survive 
compared to either GB or the BRAC programme.  
 
 





















1988 1098.8 8  6 2.43o.19 0 841.18 0.134 21.98 19.5 
1989 344.21 8 7.5 7.83 0.63 0 70.42 0.1205 1.72 20.27 
1990 358.24 8 7 10.20 0.82 0 129.61 0.135 3.58 20.45 
1991 343.81 8 7.5 17.20 1.38 
1168.0 
3.02 0 147.79 
1997 226.09 
0 44.19 0.148 1.72 26.30 
1992 1054.0 8 7 8.7 0.70 0 261.16 0.11 10.54 36.69 
1993 8 6.5 3.45 0.28 0 379.22 0.12 17.52 38.5 
1994 1369 8 6.4 3.02 0.24 0 448.03 0.13 21.90 37.6 
1995 2929.3 8 39.9 3.19 0 108.82 0.15 5.86 35.9 35.9 
1996 1442.0 8 7.5 0.24 0.16 7.21 30.49 
8 7.5 2,05 0.16 0 10.86 0.16 0.58 33.37 





S=annual subsidy received by the programme 
A=concessional borrowed finds outstanding 
M=interest rate the programme would be assumed to pay for borrowed funds if access to concessional borrowed 
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      Funds was estimated 
C=concessional rate of interest actually paid on concessional borrowed funds outstanding 
E=average annual equity 
K=sum of all other subsidies received 
 
LP=average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the programme  
I=sum of all other subsidies received 
              S 
SDI=    
            LP*I                       
 
6.4 Factors Underlining the Differences in the Efficiency of Operation of the 
MFIs 
Before concluding this Chapter, some comments are warranted as to why there are under-
MFI differences on their operating costs.  More importantly, it is also necessary to provide 
some explanations as to what are the factors underlying the overall efficiency of the various 
MFIs as indicated by their financial effiiciency indicators. These issues are briefly 
highlighted below: 
 
Trends in unit costs per member and the costs of delivering credit provide indicators of 
financial efficiency and potentials for longterm viability of the different programs.  For 
Grameen Bank, cost of delivery has not declined from the initial 1989 period, rather, it has 
increased to a peak of Table 1.1 in 1996 and the cost of coverage has shown gradual upward 
trend till 1996.  These indicators suggest that the program is not in a position to cover its 
costs by the interest rates that GB is charging to its borrowers, leaving a sustained injury to 
the programs long term financial viability. 
 
In comparison to GB, the BRAC’s programs shows a relatively strong position in terms 
of cost of delivery and cost of coverage.  In recent years, the cost of coverage shows a 
declining trend, while cost of delivery was impressure in 1993-1995 period, showing a sign 
of financial viability. However, it is to be noted that interest incomes are unable to offset 
administrative costs associated with the delivery of credit.  
 
In case of BRDB’s RD-12 program, the cost of delivery shows an expected sign, being 
the lowest and hence the most viable amongst the tree programs in terms of cost efficiency:   
 
The overall results of our analyses suggest that the MFIs need to redesign their 
programmes in order to cover their costs of operation through interest incomes received from 
the borrowers. This can be approached in two ways:  (a) increasing the interest rate and  (b) 
improving the administrative efficiencies.  Resorting to the first alternative nay drive out the 
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borrowers, because of increased cost of borrowing. This would also put on further barrier to 
the access to the credit facilities by the poorest of the poor, who allegedly are still outside the 
ambit of the MFIs.  Secondly, this may lead to rise in the rate of defaults. Therefore, it 
appears that the MFIs require to resort to the second option, i.e., restructure their 
administrative style and operation in order cut down costs and improve efficiencies so that 
they could remain viable, even without the subsidies that they are currently enjoying.   
 
Another financial efficiency issue which receives serious policy attention is the high 
interest rates charged by the MFIs from their borrowers; the question often raised :  Is lending 
to the poor inherently more costly ?  Or are there inefficiency in the operation of the 
programs ?  
This is an area which calls for continued research with analytical rigour. The analysis 
carried out by the present study of cost structure, subsidy dependence and break-even interest 
rate does not show optimistic results, leaving the question of the issue of long-term viability 
of lending to the poor persons unresolved. One way of approaching the problem is to reorient 
the MFIs to act as independent profit maximisers so that the marginal cost of additional loans 
remains below marginal revenue.  Transformation of MFIs into profit maximizing entities is 
not plausible due to income structure of their target groups, because the poor borrowers in 
that case may have to pay much more to obtain credit from the MFI, though economically 




Another way of addressing the problem of high break-even interest  rate is to look at the 
administrative and operational structure of the MFIs and to probe into the operations of the 
programs to see whether the programs are mired by administrative inefficiencies. 
 
The second line of enquiry might be to find out whether there exists any correlation 
between small average loan size and administrative overheads, resulting in a high cost of 
delivery, putting strain  on the financial viability of the program itself and giving rise to 




Chapter  7 
 
 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
7.0  Introduction 
The credit programmes implemented  by various MFIs have been expected to achieve notable 
results, if not spectacular success, in alleviating rural poverty by putting a break  on the reign 
of the moneylenders as lack of access to resources is thought to be a critical factor underlying 
widespread poverty. The village moneylender has a comparative advantage in small-scale 
lending. Especially three problems  – returns to scale, adverse selection and moral hazard – 
allow the village moneylenders to maintain monopoly in the rural credit market. The group 
based lending model, pioneered against such backdrop, addresses moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Moral hazard is done away with through peer monitoring while adverse selection is 
addressed through the process of selection of borrowers as the members are highly selective 
about who they will join with. Importantly, choosing candidates for loans and monitoring the 
progress of  repayments are all done by the group members themselves, not directly by 
officials of MFIs. Moreover, there is a strong incentive (conditionality!) attached to the group 
to help each other out as members of the group can only get loans if other members succeed 
in investment, meaning keeping the repayment schedule regular without default. 
 
7.1  Economic Impact 
Credit is seen as a critical element in poverty alleviation, though credit as a sufficient 
condition requires rigorous scrutiny and yet to obtain verdict in its favour. Nevertheless, it is 
argued that credit demonstrates a three-pronged role: firstly, as an input to generate 






The analysis in the previous chapter  has shown that there is a shift towards self-
employment from farm-employment, which may be attributed to programme intervention. 
This may also be seen as an indicator of change in favour of productive employment as 
agricultural activities in Bangladesh is mired by low productivity and underemployment. 
 
The interventions have succeeded in infusing savings habit among the poor, no mater how 
small the amount is. 
 
 76
A before-after comparison of asset holding by the group members  made in the previous 
chapter  does not reveal any  dramatic shift in the command over  resources, especially in 
terms ownership of  fixed assets. The table below demonstrates that the retained earnings are 
low. Perhaps, the sector they have chosen to invest lacks economies of scale. The rate of 
return is so minimal that they hardly are able to invest in fixed assets like structures for their 
business. 
 
Table 7.1: Impact of Retained Earnings on Fixed Assets 
Indicators GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control   
Village 
Percentage of H/H having own 
land for business 
5.7 28.6 45.7 25.7 - 
Means of acquiring land - - - - - 
1.Own savings (%)  37.5 35.7 40 - 
2. Loan from MFI (%) 100 12.5 7.1  - 
3. Others (%)  50.0 57.2 60.0 - 
% of H/H own structure of the 
Business House 
8.6 37.1 17.1 20.0 2.9 
Average monthly income from 
NFA (Tk.) 
1580 2700 2944 2563 880 
Source: Field Survey, 1998 
 
7.2  Impact on Human Resource Development 
 
It is desirable that the cost-effectiveness of poverty focussed programmes   is assessed in 
terms of both direct and indirect benefits accruing to the participants. The analysis in chapter 
6  indicates that these programmes are so highly  subsidised that their sustenance may be in  
serious doubts,  if subsidy is withdrawn. But, it is argued that subsidy is not to be restricted to 
its strict economic connotation, rather it is to be viewed from whom it benefits. The pertinent  
questions are: Does the subsidy reach to the poor? Does subsidy go to educate the programme 
participants? Does the subsidy go to improve their environmental and reproductive health? It 
is observed  that if the answers to these  questions are found to be positive, it is justified on 
the ground of social welfare as lack of human capital and social opportunities are critical 
determinants of pervasive poverty. The present analysis is not primarily geared towards 
examining the issue of subsidy-welfare trade off, but looks at the intra-household impacts of 
credit programme on education, sanitation and environmental health and reproductive health. 
 
The impact on human capital, summarised in Table 7.2, exibits a positive correlation 
when compared against control village. The indicators such as literacy, children’s schooling, 
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use of sanitary latrine etc. signals a positive spillover effect in contrast to non-programme 
village. The health and reproductive indicators do not bear out any clear picture. 
 
Table 7.2: Welfare Impacts of Credit Programmes on the Survey Households 
 
Welfare indicators GB BRAC WFP BRDB Control   
Village 
Average uneducated member per H/H 
(person) 
2.2 2.1 2.4 1.5 3.4







Average Expenses for food per H/H 
(Taka) 
1714 2025 2955 2457 2189
Percentage of H/H owning Hand-pumps 65.7 22.9 74.3 31.4
Percentage of H/H using Sanitary 
Latrine 
54 88 77 6
Percentage of H/H adopting Family 
planning 
62.9 68.6 88.6 77.1 65.7
Place of birth of Children: House (%) 94.5 100.0 97.0 99.1
Percentage of population breast feed 96.8 99.0 97.7 97.3 100
Average age at first marriage 16.5 16.6 16.7 17.6 18.4
Average number of children per H/H 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.4 1.9
 Source: Field Survey, 1998 
 
7.3  Programme-level Financial Viability 
 
The issue of  programme-level financial efficiency is captured through examining the income 




In case of Grameen Bank, the cost of delivery has not declined from the initial year1989,  
rather has increased to a peak of 1.11 in 1996 (Table 7.3). The unit cost of coverage has also 
increased over the years, leaving a negative mark on the financial viability of the programme. 
In BRAC’s RDP, the cost of delivery has remained almost stable  at around 0.50 barring the 
successful period of 1993 - 1995 when it   went down to a low of 0.12.  The unit cost of 
coverage shows a mixed trend, not indicating favourable trend in terms of financial 
efficiency. The unit cost of coverage of RD-12 programme of BRDB shows clear declining 
trends  demonstrating a sign of financially efficiency. The cost of delivery has also remained 





The application of break-even interest rate, computed on the basis of the Mosley (1993) 
equation, to the GB data results in an average interest rate of 18 per cent while the interest 
rates computed  for BRAC and BRDB comes out to be 30 per cent and 20 per cent 
respectivesly. 
 
In case of GB, the SDI estimate, measured by Yaron equation (1992), suggests that an 
average increase of 100 percent in lending rate would have been required to eliminate all 
subsidies during the reported period while an average increase of 184 percent in RDP lending 
rate is required for BRAC. The subsidy dependence index, measured by Yaron equation 
(1992) suggests that  the BRDB has received an annual subsidy of 10 million Taka per year. 
 





1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
GB 0.08 0.67 0.66 0.71 0.59 0.53 0.64 1.11 0.76 









0.16 0.11 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.32 0.22 0.21 
GB 17.64 20.34 22.79 16.5 14.85 16.30 16.85 18.36 
BRAC 38.5 39.47 39.25 40.67 23.16 18.5 22.55 24.75 
Break-even Interest 
Rate 
BRDB 16.03 18.60 18.92 19.56 23.49 23.04 24.05 22.52 
GB 1.52 1.43 1.15 0.73 0.22 0.56 0.98 1.12 
BRAC 2.33 2.39 2.40 1.67 1.25 1.36 1.54 1.69 
Subsidy Dependence 
Index 
BRDB 20.45 26.30 36.69 38.5 37.6 35.9 33.37 
Source: Estimated  from various annual reports of the respective organisations 
 
7.4  Impact on Poverty Incidence 
 
It is desirable to conduct investigation into the  impact of the credit programmes on poverty 
incidence with requisite  samples. But as  noted earlier, since the present study rests on a very 
small size of sample, it uses secondary sources of data to comprehend the incidence of the 
credit programme on poverty. The impact of Grameen Bank, BRAC and RD-12 programmes 
on poverty incidence is reported in Table 7.4. The overall results suggest a  positive impact in 
reducing poverty in the programme areas. The incidence of moderate poverty is reported to 
be lower in Grameen Bank (62  per cent in programme village compared to 72 per cent in 
control villages) and BRDB RD-12 (64 per cent compared to 67 per cent amongst non-
participants). 
 
A large majority (60 per cent) in these villages lives in poverty despite  programme 
interventions. This  suggests a narrow coverage within the programme area and/or these are 
constrained to adequately address the dynamics of the underlying poverty process (CPD, 
1995). Despite the success and rapid growth of poverty alleviation programmes both by the 
government and NGOs, the extent of such interventions is yet to attain a critical mass to be 
able to create a perceptible improvement in the poverty scene in Bangladesh (Mujeri, 1997). 
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Table 7.4: Impact of Credit Programmes on Poverty Incidence 
Incidence of Moderate 
Poverty (%) 
Incidence of Extreme 
Poverty (%) 















Grameen Bank 62 72 10 17 Less -- 4 
BRAC 70 67 14 
RD-12 
16 -- -- 1 
64 67 -- -- Less -- 6 
Note: Moderate poverty refers to a minimum intake 2121 k.cal. per capita per day while extreme poverty 
designates 1805 k.cal/capita/day. 
Source: Khandker and Chowdhury (1995) 
 
Cost-Effectiveness of Transfer-mode Operation 
 
FFEP is the fastest growing safety net programme, accounting for 43 per cent of the primary 
education budget in 1997-98 Annual Development Programme (ADP). Analyses have shown 
that FFEP has augmented enrolment almost by four  times and has been found to be the most 
cost-effective safety net programme in its impact, although the issue of targeting has 



















The FFEP has increased enrolment and attendance, but failed to make headway as regards 
to two critical quality indicators – drop-out rate and repeaters. When sustainability is 
considered,  these two indicators leave room for greater  improvements suggesting   drastic 
redesign of the programe.  Especially,  better targeting is urgently required. 
 
A pertinent issue that warrants attention at this point is – are these programs replicable in 
wider areas and what are their linkages potentials with macro interventions ?  The socio-
economic benefits and linkage potentials  of the micro-credit interventions are noteworthy 
and replicable on many grounds.  However, their replication in wider areas needs to be 
preceded by important changes and modifications.  These issues are discussed below at some 
length: 
 
First,  the micro-finance programs receive widespread acclaim for lending to the poor 
without collateral through group-based approach. This  group-based lending approach is seen 
as successful credit regime in rescuing the poor from the  exploitation of the rural money 
lenders and failure of the government-managed formal lending institutions to reach the poor. 
Second, the programs have impacted positively on the borrowers’ socio-economic 
conditions and human resource development variably as evident from the survey results.  It 
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also has acted favourably in terms of employment generation, no matter with what modest 
changes in their retained incomes and ownership of fixed assets. 
Finally, any redesign of such programs should take cognisance, of the size of the loans 
and issues relating to operational and financial efficiency. In addition, attempts may be made 
to design special government-run programs to cover the poorest of the poor and other 
 
However, these programs have not been impressive in terms of their financial 
sustainability  as they appear to continue to be heavily dependent on grants received from the 
donors.  Moreover, the other financial efficiency indicators such as cost of delivery, unit cost 
of coverage and break-even interest rate etc. do not show encouraging signs in terms of long-
run financial viability.  For any form of replicabity, it is vital to redesign the programs in a 
manner so that administrative overhead can be slashed down without affecting the low rate of 
default.  This calls for careful examination of size of loan and operational structure in order to 
avoid/minimise administrative deficiencies. 
 
Further,  the strong focus on micro-credit may pose special problems in reaching the 
poorest. Group lending may excluded the poorest because they represent too big a risk to a 
group or because they may not have the skills required participate in the group.  Land-based 
target’s may not ensure that MFIs reach the poorest.  These include constraints faced by the 
poorest themselves, such as lack of initial savings to participate in group meeting.  Avoiding 




Apart from the poorest, these MFIs, as evident from the field visits, also exclude other 
two types of potential borrowers -  the  ‘missing middle’,  i.e. the low-income farmers in 
terms of both land and ownership of non-land assets, who do not qualify for micro-credit and 
are also unable to obtain formal credits.  These potential borrowers who belong to both 
agriculture and non-farm occupations, are ineligible for micro-credit, because they own more 
than 0.5 acres of land, but are not wealthy enough to weild influence among the institutional 
lenders. 
 
These considerations suggest a market segmentation of the rural borrowers and also 
perhaps growth of specific types of MFIs needed to cater to different segments of the market 
with financial prudence. Thus, apart from the marginal landowners and the landless who are 
being catered by MFIs, it is required to bring the poorest and endigent into the fold of the 
MFIs. Theoe who are now remaining outside the ambit of MFIs need to be provided with 




disadvantaged groups, i.e. female-headed household as second best solutions to ensure wider 
coverage and supplement the MFI interventions. 
 
7.5  Emerging Concerns: Need for  Further Investigation 
 
The following areas, which remain outside the scope of the present study, have emerged 
during the course of the field visit and analysis of the survey results, indicating  further 
research  for ascertaining  the sustainability of these alternative poverty alleviation 
programmes. 
 
The Micro-Macro Mismatch 
 
Despite repeated  assertions by the MFI’s of their success stories and increase in coverage, 
the rate of decline in national poverty remains modest. This leads to questions: why have not 




A recent BIDS study on PKSF-MES reveals that members in 16 per cent of the participant 
households enrolled in more than one NGOs. Is the cost of borrowing (high interest rate 
charged by MFIs) pushing the borrowers to become members of multiple MFIs in order to 
maintain repayment schedule? Is it because that the size of the loanable amount is too meager 
to start even a small productive venture? 
 
Issue of Graduation 
 
The issue of graduation of the members has surfaced as a second generation problem of the 
micro-credit based programmes. As evident from the Table 7.4, the micro-credit has not been 
able to make perceptible changes among the rural poor in relation to the number of poor. It is 
seen that a large number of borrowers have failed to retain earnings, increase savings and 
investment, and continue to depend on fresh loans as they failed to increase investible 
surplus. A recent BIDS Survey (1998) indicates that only eight out of 85 per cent of once 
borrowers are not currently borrowing. This suggests the need for a detailed investigation into 
the borrowers’ sustainability on longitudinal basis. 
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Informal Credit Market Persists 
 
Contrary to common perception, the BIDS survey reveals that more than 40 per cent of 
sample households in programme villages and about 56 per cent of those in control villages 
had borrowed from sources other than NGOs and the organised sector. Is it because of the 
very insignificant amount available as loans from the MFIs? Is it because of high interest rate 
charged by MFIs? The BIDS survey claims that the interest rates charged by the local 
moneylenders, though high, are still significantly lower than those charged by MFIs. This 
suggests that the interface between MFI lending and that by the informal financial market 
demands more rigorous probing. 
 
Graduation and Repayment Schedule 
 
During field investigation, some MFI participants observed that the impractical repayment 
schedule is inhibiting their graduation and making them dependent on the MFIs. The question 
that arises and  requires rigorous analysisis: Do the borrowers pay out of current income? Are 
the participants able to use their loans in productive ventures with such  pressing demand for 
repayment? 
 
Who are growing? 
 
Across the board it is acknowledged that the rate of interest is high. Indeed the analysis of the  
programme level financial viability shows that the MFIs need to keep  higher rates of interest 
in place to remain financially viable. The question remains: How would one term them 
financially viable if they continue to charge such exhorbitant interest rates which are  higher 
than the  commercial lending rates? Is there any institutional constraint which requires the 
MFIs  to charge such high interest rates?  These issues are critically important and need to be 
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